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SUMMARY
The Surf Clam Subboard of the Northeast Marine
Fisheries Board asked for alternative management schemes
which would protect the surf clam resource and the industry
which depends upon it.

In our view this dual goal can be

attained only by a scheme which embodies some form of
limited entry or property rights to the resource in
addition to provisions which are resource-oriented.
Our choice of a suitable management program is
a catch rights scheme.

Second choice is a limitation on

catching capacity and third choice is licensing a limited
number of vessels.

The catch rights program seems signifi-

cantly superior to the others.

There follows a brief

presentation of alternative management schemes, the
jurisdictional and legal basis for management, and
alternative manageiment regimes.
Alternate Management Schemes
The catch rights scheme involves subdivision of
an annual catch quota (MSY or other number) into a large
number of Catch Rights units which would be issued to
the industry, probably by a formula recognizing past
performance, as licenses to catch an established quantity
of clams.

Catch Rights would become items of property

being salable under stipulated conditions.

The catch

rights approach is effective in protecting the resource
and in protecting the economic v:lability of the industry.

2.

The benefits of the measure are incident on holders of
catch rights.

It allows a maximum of flexibility to

industry in decid:ing how, when and where to harvest
their catch.

It does not preclude modifications to

improve or refine the utilization of the resource.

It

is not prohibitiv4ely expensive to implement, monitor and
enforce.

There appear to be no insurmountable legal

problems.
The othier two schemes are similar in concept but
differ in details, one focusing on the vessel, the other
on the effectiven,ess of the fishing unit.

As in the

case with Catch Rights, licenses would be issued under
some "grandfathering" formula.

They could be salable

items of property or the property rights could be retained
by the management authority.

Both alternative schemes

would limit the total catch and limit entry into the
fishery by placing a limit on the number of licenses issued.
Licenses would entitle the holder to operate (in one
scheme) a certain defined category of vessel or (in the
other option) a certain number of complexly defined catch
capacity units.

Benefits of limited entry under either

scheme would accrue to the industry.
enforcement would be cumbersome.

Administration and

Legal questions, though

perhaps more complex than in the catch rights scheme,
do not appear insurmountable.
Each of the basic management schemes is amenable
to refinement by incorporation of resource oriented
provisions such as size limits to maximize yield per
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recruit, and area closures to prevent harvest of small
rapidly growing clams, or to provide a spawning sanctuary.
We prefer the catch capacity scheme to the vessel
scheme because of its greater flexibility.

It can better

accommodate changing status of the resource and industry
and can be more readily adjusted to allow for technological
advances.

FurthE~rmore, if property rights are assigned, the

catch capacity scheme provides for smaller, cheaper units
and thus a. larger market.

4

Jurisdiction
The surf clam resource falls under the jurisdiction of several states and the federal government.
Although the present management framework is a blend
of the old and the new,

the key to understanding

present state and federal roles in fishery management
is the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976.
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act
of 1976 (FCMA) created a fishery conservation zone (FCZ)
for waters 197 nautical miles beyond the seaward boundary
of each of the coastal states of the United States.
FCMA became effective on March 1, 1977 and vests in the
United States exclusive management authority over all
fish within the fishery conservation zone, and all
continental shelf fishery resources beyond the FCZ, as
well as providing for United States jurisdiction over
anadromous species except when they enter waters under
the jurisdiction of other nations.

At the international

level, no claims of sovereignty in the waters in this
zone are made and no interference with recognized
legitimate uses of the high seas, except as are necessary
to implement fishery management and conservation, are
authorized by the Act.

The states retain most of their

traditional rights in relation to fishery regulation
under the new Act.

5
State jurisdiction over fisheries is recognized
in conunon law principles, court decision, and both state
and federal legislation.

State jurisdiction has been

recognized to extend not only to internal and territorial
waters of a state but also to include State vessels and
citizens on the high seas operating beyond state territorial
waters.

Through landing regulation states have also acted

to control non-resident fishing activities.

It must be

remembered that such state authority has been and will
continue to be subject to the exercise of certain paramount
federal powers.
Under FCMA state authority over internal waters
is reserved completely to the states while state authority
over territorial waters is reserved to the states subject
to certain exceptions.

State jurisdiction over its

vessels and citizens beyond territorial waters remain
possible only if there is no conflict with regulations
within the FCA.

State control over non~resident~ recently

an issue before the United States Supreme Court, is also

questionable undE~r FCMA.

The portion of FCMA, p_ertinent

to state jurisdiction is Section 306 and it states:
(a) In General. --Except as provided in subsection (b), nothing in this Act shall be construed
as extending or diminishing the jurisdiction or
authority of any State within its boundaries.
No State may directly or indirectly regulate
any fishing which is engaged in by any fishing
vessel outside its boundaries, unless such
vessel is registered under the laws of such State.
(b)

Exception.--(1) If the Secretary finds ••.
that--
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(A) the fishing in a fishery, which
is covered by a fishery management plan
implemented under this Act, is engaged in
predominantly within the fishery conservation zone and beyond such zone; and
(B) any State has taken any action,
or omitted to take any action, the results
of which will substantially and adversely
affect the carrying out of such fishery
management plan;
the Secretary shall promptly notify such State and
the appropriate Council of such finding and of his
intention to regulate the applicable fishery within
the boundaries of such State (other than its
internal waters), pursuant to such fishery management plan and the regulations promulgated to
implement such plan.
(2) If the sneretary ... finds that the
reasons for which he assumed such regulation no
longer prevail, he shall promptly terminate such
regulation.
The Act reaffirms the right of a state to regulate
fishing even beyond its territorial waters where its own
citizens or vessels are involved.

However, the FCMA also

seems to limit a state's control beyond the three mile waters
to these instances and circumstances alone.

By forbidding

a state to "directly or indirectly" regulate fishing beyond
its boundaries, excepting the above two instances, the FCMA
renders state regulation aimed at nonresidents and
effected through landing laws dubious in validity.
Furthermore, if federal regu'lation in the conservation zone is exercised, even permissible extended state
regulation which conflicted with it would have to yield
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.

Even

without conflict, federal regulation in a particular area
might pre-empt exercise of state power in the same area.
The surf clam is one of the enumerated fisheries
subject to the conservation and management provisions of
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the FCMA.

Power granted under the FCMA will be used to

regulate the surf clam fishery beyond state territorial
waters within the conservation zone.

Whether federal

power will be used even within state waters as provided
by Section 306 (b) remains to be seen.

Certainly the

FCMA has laid the groundwork for a vigorous federal program
of fishery management.
Leg a 1 Bas is for Managemer!:.!.

Under FCMA it is possible for state and federal
management authority to coexist. It is also clear to most
observers that any effective scheme for the management
and conservation of fisheries resources must include
limiting the amount of fishing effort.

Therefore, it is

imperative to consider the legal implications of such a
management policy under state and federal law before
attempting to formulate or implement any specific plan.
In establishing any limited entry program, free
access to the resource will be restricted.

This creates

the possibility that persons who were previously taking
as much of the resource as they desired might challenge
the program.

Their challenge would most likely rest on

due process and/or equal protection grounds under the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution,
and on any similar provisions of state constitutions.

It

is important, therefore, to examine due process and equal
protection standards in order to be able to satisfy
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constitutional r1equirements in formulating a program.
The Constitutional standards of due process
equal protection are not mathematical formulas which
can be applied to a statute to give a positive yes or no
answer regarding its validity.

They are flexible measures

of the limits of state regulation over individual activity.
On the basis of past decisions it appears that the federal
courts would uphold a reasonable, non-discriminatory
limited entry scheme.

Economic and conservation regula-

tions in the public interest are valid areas of state
concern.

To help assure that a.n act is upheld, any limited

entry scheme should be supported by the best available
biological and economic data proving that such regulation is necessary and in the public interest.

Careful

drafting of the scheme to assure that similarly situated
individuals are treated alike will also help sustain the
program from constitutional attack.
A potential legal problem that must not be overlooked in evaluating the legal viability of any management
scheme is that many of the decisions supportive of marine
resource management have been couched in terms of biological
justification.

And, although the biology and economics of

a fishery are closely intertwined,economic justifications
for management have not been given the same weight or
consideration as have biological factors.

Although

promoting sound ,economic management of a fishery has been
held to be a legitimate purpose for state regulation, the
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legal precedent is much less extensive than for biological
regulation.

If a truly enlightened management posture is

to be achieved, there must be wider recognition of the
fact that management is not solely for the sake of resource
itself, but management is for the benefit of people--the
economics of the fishery and the benefits to the people
go hand-in-hand.
In addition to the Constitution of the United
States and the Fishery Cunservation and Management Act of
1976, the laws of Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia are
analyzed.

Constitutional, statutory, or regulatory language

is often subject to differing interpretations.

As a

practical matter:, the limiting factor in many cases may
be interpretation and implementation at the management
level.

For thesE~ reasons it is important for state

management authorities and their legal advisors to review
their own statutes, reguJations, and administrative customs
in order to determine what scope of management authority
exists within the statutory framework.

Although other

legal considerations were addressed on a state by state
basis, the following is a summary of the findings regarding
the status of limited entry in state law.
New York
The New York constitutional standards should not
bar limited entry.

The state ranks preservation of natural
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resources very highly.

The statutory grant of power would

appear to give the Department of Environmental Conservation
the authority to limit entry and consider economic factors
in reg~lating a fishery.
New Jersey
The New Jersey constitutional requirement should
be easily met by a limited entry scheme.

The mandate to

the New Jersey management entity is broad enough to include
promulgation of regulations for limited entry.

The

present shellfish regulation are statutory, so any limited
entry program would have to either (1) meet the same
standards as the existing statutes or (2) include legislative action to amend or repeal the shellfish laws.
Delaware
The Delaware Constitution should not bar a
limited entry scheme.

The Commission of Shell Fisheries

has a broad mandate to regulate the industry, including
licensing vessels and issuing permits to persons engaged
in the industry.

This authority contains no restrictions

as to what factors may be considered in setting management
poli~y.
Maryland
· Under due process and equal protection, Maryland
courts should uphold a limited entry scheme, but care must
be taken to avoid the anti-monoply term of the Constitution.
The broad authority given to the Department of Natural
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Resources should include the ability to impose a limited
entry scheme.
Virginia
The due process and equal protection standards of
Virginia can be met, as long as the "special laws" standard
is observed.

The state has a constitutional policy of

resource conservation.

The management authority is broad,

and surf clam management is specifically authorized, so a
limited entry scheme for surf clams should be acceptable.
Connecticut
Connecticut's constitutional law would accept limited
entry, although the common law tradition of right to work
will require firm proof that regulation is needed.

The

statutory management scheme is very tight, leaving little
room for any implied powers.

Connecticut would require

legislation to implemC-"nt limited entry.

Since existing

legislation allows a daily catch limit to be set for oysters,

limited entry should not be foreign or replusive to the
Legislature.

It would, however, be outside the statutory

authority of present management agencies to initiate
such a scheme.
North Carolina
The common law supporting the right to work will
have to be carefully considered in drafting limited entry
legislation for North Carolina.

Before fishermen can be
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excluded, the need for limited entry will have to be
clearly demonstrated and the allocation scheme will have to
be carefully developed.

However, some precedent exists

for economic management of fisheries in North Carolina.
Shrimp seasons, for example, are opened and closed on the
basis of the commercial size of the shrimp, a factor
unrelated to biological conservation.

The state might be

willing to accept economic criteria for fishery management.
In contrast with the state constitutional law,
the management statutes are quite broad and imply a great
deal of paver vested in the management agencies.

The

agency can license vessels and clammers, and tax clams
to the statutory limit.
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ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS FOR MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT
AND IMPLEMENTATION

Many variations exist for development and
implementation.

Because jurisdiction under FCMA exists,

as a general rule only in the FCZ, a species could be subject
to a management plan developed and implemented under FCMA
and also subject to state or interstate plans directed
at management in tnternal and territorial waters.

Manage-

ment programs may be developed and implemented with varying
opportunities for success, by individual states, by mutual
agreement among states involved in the fishery, by mutual
agreement among states and the Federal Government, or by
the Federal Government alone.

Since FCMA does not

necessarily preclude the existence or development of
other regulatory mechanisms, various alternatives for
management development and implementation exists via
unilateral and intergovernmental mechanisms.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
A.

Adopt one of the three schemes or a modification

thereof.
B.

Develop a detailed management plan including a

schedule of implementation.

The plan and schedule should

provide for the following:
1.

Development and legal review of an allocation
(grandfathering) plan for distributing catch rights
or licenses.

2.

Determination of the property attributes to be
lodged in catch rights or licenses and the
mechanisms for issuance, exchange, and for
recording exchanges.

3.

A schedule of and responsibility for data
collecting, processing, analysis, interpretation
and dissE~mination.

4.

A schedule of and responsibility for review and
revision of the management program.

5.

A schedule of and responsibility for research
to answer specific questions of managerial
significance.
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INTRODUCTION
It has long been established that fisheries whose
products enjoy a strong market tend to overfish the resource
and to attract fishing capacity in excess of that required
to take the harv,estable surplus.

The surf clam fishery

exemplifies these unfortunate properties of common property
fisheries in that the catch has risen from a brief plateau
of approximately 60 million pounds in the early 70's to
a peak of 96 million pounds in 1974 and then declined to
49 million in 1976.

At the same time the fleet increased

from approximately 100 vessels in 1970 to near 150 by the
end of 1976.
It is apparent that the harvesting capacity has
over-reached the reproductive capability of the stock.

To

harvest more from the stock than it is capable of producing
is both biologically and economically wasteful.

However

nothing inherent in the economics of the industry prevents
overharvesting.

Indeed, the strong market demand for surf

clams drives the industry toward overharvesting.

In the

absence of property rights or other inherent economic
controlling mechanism, external governmental control must
be exerted if the productivi'ty of the resource is to be
maintained and a climate is to be maintained in which
businesses can operate with reasonable expectation of
profit and reasonable predictability of amortization rates.
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While the need for management is clear, the
appropriate choice among the large assortment of alternative management mechanisms is not.

Therefore the Surf Clam

Subcouncil of the: Northeast Marine Fisheries Council asked
for alternative management schemes which would accomplish
1
the goals of protecting the industry which uses it. This
paper was developed from the report submitted to the Council.
It was occasioned by the passage of the Fishery Conservation
and Management Ac:t of 1976 which significantly improves the
regulatory environment.

The modifications to the original

report are essentially those needed to make it consistent
with this Act.

·rhe objective o:E the discussion set forth

in Part I is to eixamine the advantages and disadvantages
of a few such management schemes.

The legal implications

associated with the development and implementation of
various management alternatives are addressed in Part II.
The capital investment required for efficient
plants and vessels is high in relationship to their
predictable economic life in an unmanaged fishery.

The

lack of control of the supply of its raw material places
the surf clam industry in a position of higher risk than
most other industries.

If overfishing occurs plants and

vessels will become unprofitable before the end of their
useful life.

A management program should provide access

to the common property resource in a fashion that gives the
clammingindustry a stability of supply similar to that
experienced by other, non-seafood industries.

That is,
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the regulations should provide a framework within which
clamming businesses enjoy approximately the same
opportunities for success or failure as business outside of
the seafood industry.

History shows that without govern-

mental regulation of harvest, businesses utilizing a corrnnon
property resourcE~ cannot expect reasonable return on capital
investment in th,~ long run.

Providing greater stability

of the resource and greater predictability of the extent of
competition for the resource (and thus a degree of stability
to investment) is considered to meet the goal of protecting
the industry.
The goal of protecting the resource is considered
to be met by preventing average harvest from exceeding
average maximum sustainable yield (MSY).

18

FOOTNOTES
1.

The names of these two groups subsequently were changed to
Surf Clam Sub-board and Northeast Marine Fisheries Board
to reduce thei possibility of confusing them with the
Regional Management Councils created by the Fisheries
Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (PL 94-265).

PART I
MANAGEMENT SCHEMES

19

INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most direct and specific type of
management is "resource-oriented."

Examples of this type

of regulation include closed seasons and areas, minimum
size regulations, catch limits, and spawning sanctuaries.
Certain biological requirements, intra-seasonal adjustments, and fine-tuning might be accomplished with various
resource-oriented regulations, e.g., area closures, size
limits, etc.

Appropriate use of these methods depends on

an extensive understanding of the biological characteristics
of the species and is beyond the scope of this discussion.
However, it is important in applying these techniques to
consider their complementarity with the entry limitation
schemes under discussion.

For example, while each scheme

requires as input the total desired annual catch for the
fishery, the application of aggregate quota regulations
without effort limitations will elicit the inevitable
race for clams which could dissipate most of the potential
economic gains from management.

The implications of

various resource-oriented regulations should be studied
carefully in conjunction with possible complementary limited
entry measures.
While various resource oriented schemes may
sufficiently protect the resource, some form of
controlled access is recognized as necessary to accomplish
the goal of protecting the industry.

Controlled access
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or "limited entry" schemes differ from the resource-related
schemes in being explicitly cognizant of economic factors
and therefore can offer substantial economic benefits
to fishermen.

We define limited entry schemes as those

which directly or indirectly limit the amount of fishing
effort to some dE~sired level.

An assumption of the dis-

cussion which follows is that some form of a limited entry
scheme is desired.

The degree to which benefits would be

incident on fishE~rmen, the effectiveness, and the cost of
controlling effort will influence the desirability of
limited entry measures, and these factors will themselves
be determined to a considerable extent by the particular
method employed to limit entry.
It is clear that one alternative is a continuation
of a laissez-faire or "do-nothing" policy.

The consequences

of such policy will be dissipation of profits to fishermen;
that is, the division of a diminishing resource among more
and more fishermen.

The analysis of Gates (1974) clearly

indicated substantial benefits in excess of $5 million
annually from limited entry. 1
Much rE~mains to be learned about the biology,
especially population dynamics of the surf clam.

A funda-

mental question which urgently needs consideration is the
quality of knowlE~dge necessary to initiate management
measures.

Every additional boat which enters the fishery

is prolonging the inevitable adjustment

process and making
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it more expensiv,~.

At some point a decision must be made

based on the best available information.

The question is,

will this decision be made before or after stock depletion
and bankruptcy of many fishermen in the surf clam fishery.
In the following sections, we outline alternative
methods of limit:ing entry.

Before doing so we wish to repeat

that limited entry and resource-oriented schemes should be
complementary rather than competitive instruments of
management.

There are many variations on the theme of

limited entry but two broad approaches are presented:
(1) an indirect approach in which property rights in the
resource are ass:igned to the users so that the users themselves determine the level of fishing effort to deploy
under the influence of the various economic constraints
affecting the industry (2) a. direct approach in which the
governmental management agency determines the optimum
number of units of gear and issues a limited number of
licenses.

In thie second case, property rights may be lodged

in the licenses, but need not be.

In the discussion which

follows three hypothetical "packages" are presented, one
indirect scheme, and two direct schemes.

They have been

constructed so as to reduce the disadvantages inherent in the
individual components of each package.

Considering the

large number of permutations possible, the number of options
has necessarily been restricted.

The following should,

therefore, be regarded as a framework for discussion and
not as an exhaustive catalogue.
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FOOTNOTES
1.

Gates, J.M. 1974. The Benefits to Fishermen of
Limited Entry Measures in the Surf Clam Fishery.
Rhode Island Agricultural Experiment Station
Contribution number 1538 Kingston, R. I.
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CATCH RIGHTS
The elE~ments of a Catch Rights scheme are (1)
selection of a quota (2) subdivision of quota into a large
number of Catch Rights units (CR) (3)

definition of

property aspects of CR, (4) issuance of CR (5) regulating
transfer of CR, if required (6) periodic adjustment of quota.
Theoretically the quota could be maximum sustainable yield, maximum economic efficiency, optimum yield, or
as a last resort,, an arbitrarily selected number.

The

number of units (sub-divisions of the quota) should be
large in relation to the number of vessels

operating in

the fishery to facilitate their exchange and to make possible
the harvest of small quantities for special or local
markets, such as a seasonal bait market.

The operator of

an efficient stern dredger would need many CR units to
operate throughout the year.

Having each CR represent a

relatively small proportion of the total quota would also
increase a vessel operator's flexibility to adjust to
changes in efficiency or changes in the amount of clams
that he desires to harvest.
As an alternative to catch rights whose magnitude (in bushels of clams) might change from time to time
as the population of surf clams fluctuated, we might consider
two "pools" of rfghts.

One pool, considered permanently

issued, (permanent rights) would be equal to a conservative
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estimate of the MSY (or other quota).

The other pool

would be held in reserve to adjust for fluctuations in
the population.

In years of great abundance, all of this

reserve pool of catch rights would be .issued, in years
of scarcity nonE~ would be, and in most years some intermediate
number would be issued.
Thus, periodically the management agency (MA) would
decide whether or not to issue rights from the reserve
pool, and if so!, how many.

The pressures to issue additional

reserve rights would be great and a policy for their
distribution would be needed.
auction.

One method would be public

In effect, the winning bidder would be leasing

a specific amount of reserve catch rights for a specific
time period.

At the end of that time period they would

revert to the r,~serve pool.

Another method would be to

distribute the reserve rights equally among exisiting
holders of permanent rights.

There are other formulae

which could be used but these few examples serve to
illustrate t h a t ~ policy would be needed on the distribution of reserve rights.
Implementation
Issuance of CR involves two facets, 1) the
original issuance at the outset of the management program
and 2) provisions for renewal, transfer and increase or
retirement.
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Catch rights could be issued equally to participants in the fishery as of some stipulated date of record,
or alternatively, allocated unequally by some formula based
on historic participation in and dependence on the fishery
and the cultural, social and economic framework of the
fishery 1 .
Treating equally all persons participating as of
a certain date is administratively simple, but socially
questionable in that different levels of "vested interest"
are treated the same.
Distribution based on historic participation presents
the administrative problem of developing an equitable
formula.

Determining what factors should be considered and

the importance of each would be quite contentious.

How

does a formula treat equitably the long-time participant
and the one who has just entered the fishery?

Are records

adequate to demonstrate the historic performance of
those who have been in the fishery?

Alaska's recent

experience in limiting entry demonstrates that a reasonably
equitable formula for recognizing various aspects of vested
interest can be developed though the task is not an easy
one.
As a starting point, one must decide whether
the catch rights are to be divided between the processing
sector and the fishing sector, or be issued only to the
fishing sector.

In either case among the factors to

be considered in allocating catch rights to individuals
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would be volume produced by each unit (plant, vessel,
corporation) and length of time each has been in the
clamming business (appropriate credit for replacements,
changes of names, etc.).

The greater the fisherman's or

processor's historical volume, the greater would be his
percentage share.
in the industry.

The same might be true for length of time
These catch rights could be (but need not

be) issued in return for a fee sufficient to cover
administrative costs.
In the harvesting sector one might group all the
vessels now operating or on the building ways into categories
according to their performance or performance of similar
vessels.

By multiplying the annual catch of vessels of

that class by the number of vessels in the class and
summing for all classes, one would arrive at a total
catch capacity.

Each boat (class) could then be alloted

as a catch limit (number of CR) a pro rata share of the
quota, the basis being the ratio of total catch capacity
to the quota.
The property rights which are to exist in the
CR must be determined and defined before issuance.

Some

experience exists in the governmental leasing of mineral
rights and of land rights (eg. use of publicly-owned
bottoms for oyster culture)and in limited entry fisheries
in Alaska, Washington, and a few other states.
experience could provide useful guidance.

This

The primary
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question seems to be the extent to which government can
or should relinquish its stewardship of the resource.
Decisions must be made about the following questions.
1.

Shall the CR be freely transferrable by sale
or lease, or shall there be controls such
as: transfers only by or through the management agency to record all terms; controls to
prevent speculation, tax on transfers?

2.

Shall CR be deviseable by will, shall they
pass by entestatE. succession?

3.

Shall CR be subject to tax and if so, which
taxes,property, income~ estate?

4.

Shall CR be subject to encumbrances by
creditors?

5.

Are the CR securities under any security
re,gulations?

6.

Wi.11 the CR be valid as security on a debt?

7.

Shall limitations be placed on the number
of CR to be held by one person?

8.

Shall special provisions be made for new
en.try into the fishery?

After the initial distribution, catch rights
would be exchangeable via market transactions, thus a
mechanism for their efficient redistribution would exist.
Additionally these market transactions would provide
significant compensatiort (at no cost to the management)
to anyone wishing to retire from fishing.

Adjustments
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by the MA would be made when necessary through leasing of
CR or through a scheme for buying them back or by adjusting
the catch authorized by a CR.
Analysis
A catch right (also called stock certificate by
some authors) in effect is a marketable asset, the value
of which depends on the magnitude of average profits per
pound of catch in the harvesting sector, on the size of
the catch right and on the cost of capital (i.e. the interest
rate).

As discussed by Gates (1974), rough estimates of

these profits would be 2.7¢/lb. based on MSY regulation
and 8. 4¢/lb. basE~d on MEE regulation.

.An examination of

historical data indicates annual gross revenues per vessel
of $155 thousand in 1976 versus $88 thousand in 1972; a
76% increase in four years.

During the same period, annual

catch per vessel declined by 22.5% from 63.4 thousand
pounds to 49.1 thousand pounds.

This decline is even

more drastic than is apparent since the composition of
the fleet changed significantly toward larger vessels
whose annual catch is considerably above average.

It is

therefore difficult to convert the higher gross revenues
per vessel into an estimate of profit changes since costs
have changed also.

It has been estimated however that the

indicated profit margins are now triple those obtained
earlier.

This would suggest 8¢/lb. based on MSY regula-

tion and 25¢/lb. based on MEE regulation.

Assuming
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a 50% tax rate, this would imply after tax profits of
4¢/lb. and 12¢/lb. based on MSY and MEE regulation
respectively.
The market value of these catch rights would
reflect their capitalized value which depends on the
discount rate and the time horizon.

Assuming a 20-year

horizon, the present worth factors for discount rates
10%, 12%, and 15% are 8.51, 7.46, and 6.26 respectively.
Thus, the market value of catch rights would be in the
range 25-34¢ per pound if MSY regulations were attained
and a 75-102¢ per pound if MEE regulation were attained.
If we assume a ten-year adjustment period, these rights
may be heavily discounted.

Using a 15% discount and a

ten-year adjustment period, the initial value of individual
catch rights may be expected to be 6-8¢ per pound based
on MSY regulation and 18-25¢ per pound based on MEE
regulation.

These values would increase over time as

catch per unit ,effort and net returns approach stable
values and eventually would approach the earlier value
ranges of 25-34¢ per pound and 25-102¢ per pound.
If the management agency recovers part of its
costs for research, administration and enforcement (via a
landings tax, for example), the value of catch rights would
be correspondingly reduced.

Let us assume a 1¢ per pound

levy on catch (meat weight basis).

Let us abstract from

the phase-in period which could require a decade or more.
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The initial value of individual catch rights at MSY
would then be about 5¢ per pound and would rise over
time approaching 19¢ per pound eventually.

These values

would be windfall gains, which would accrue to owners
of these rights.

An owner could realize these values

either as a lump sum payment or as an equivalent annuity
or leasing fee when he sold or leased his rights.
These estimates assume that the fishery would
be managed at a sustainable yield of 70 million pounds.
In fact the fishery has not been well managed, stock
depletion has occurred, catches have fallen despite
increased investments in vessels, and ex-vessel prices
have soared.

For the period 1968-1975, ex-vessel prices

rose gradually from about 10 cents per pound in 1968
to about 13 cents per pound in 1975.

In 1976 however,

price increases were quite remarkable, rising from
24 cents per pound in January to 36 cents in April, and
peaking at 58 cents in August.

After August, some decline

occurred; prices in December, 1976 were 52 cents.

Thus,

prices have more than quadrupled as participants have
sought to maintain their respective shares of a shrinking
resource base.

Consequently~ the numbers given should

be regarded only as rather crude estimates which are
conditional on the implementation of limited entry
measures and which can be revised as improved estimates
of costs and prices become available.
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The Catch Rights Plan places the incidence of
benefits on fish1ermen; it allows for efficient vessel
sizes and for technological improvements and for the
efficient use of labor and capital.

It can be designed

to adjust to changing conditions of prices, costs and
resource abundance.

It allows individual units of the

industry, whether a boat operator or a vertically integranted corporation some degree of latitude in optimizing
yield within the context of its own goals in contrast
to an externally defined optimum.

Management costs can

be assessed against beneficiaries by taxes on landings
or a license or property tax on catch rights.
If the catch quota were based on the concept
of MSY, each holder of CR would have the option of
harvesting at some lower level to reduce costs or to
maximize profits.

This program would prevent harvest from

exceeding MSY but would allow individuals to work toward
MEE, if they wished to.

Retirement is voluntary and

sellers are compensated.
If the partial relinquishment of governmental
trusteeship over the surf clam resource is viewed as undesirable, some method of governmental recall of the
certificates could be prescribed.

Circumstances unfore-

seen at this time might lead to the conclusion at some
point in the future that the catch rights scheme is unsatisfactory.

Catch rights might be issued for a
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stipulated period of years which could be looked upon as
a trial period during which procedures for continuation or
termination would be formulated.

One must recognize,

however, that some of the potential benefits of the catchrights scheme arE~ dependent upon security of ownership
of the rights.

The MA always has the option of entering

the catch rights market as a buyer of catch rights for
the purpose of rE~tiring them.

In this way retirement is

voluntary and sellers are compensated.
Although the concept of catch rights is not
widely applied in fisheries, the private enterprise economy
of the U.

s ..

is based on private ownership of raw materials.

An analogue of catch rights in a common property resource
is adjudicated water rights such as exist in arid western
states.

When· a groundwater aquifer (common property)

is being depleted, a court procedure can be instituted
whereby the sustainable yield of the aquifer is allocated
among the users on a pro-rata basis.

The quantity allocated

to each user is determined by his rate of use during a
stipulated base period, such as the preceding five years.
Also similar in concept to catch rights is the allocation
of radio communication frequencies.
The CR scheme differs from vessel licensing
schemes in regard to the ease with which a" fisherman can
become established.

Under a vessel licensing scheme,

the licenses would be very valuable, indivisible assets.
To maximize

thi:s value, there would be a tendency over
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time to replace small vessels with the largest, most
technically efficient vessels; even though, from an aggregate
viewpoint, two small vessels might be more cost effective
than one large vessel.

For a large vessel capturing . 9

million pounds per year and the earlier value of 19¢/lb.
the market value of the license exclusive of the boat
would be in the neighborhood of $170 thousand.

Because of

the indivisibilities and capital market imperfections,
it might be difficult for a young fisherman to get started.
This result can be contrasted with CR which are divisible
into relatively small portions of the optimum yield, as
discussed earlier.

Consider a young fisherman with a

small vessel which can be projected to catch 200 thousand
pounds.

He need not purchase a $170 thousand license

for his small vessel.

Instead he can purchase catch

rights for $38 thousand which entitle him to catch up to
200 thousand pounds.

While this sum is not trivial it is

well within the range of what family businesses such as

family farms might expect to pay for location or land
rights.

It should also be recognized that with such a

scheme, profits and hence ability to pay would be
substantially better than now.

In the case of father-son

fishing operations, there are mechanisms for intergenerational transfers of asset~ such as CR, which minimize
disruptions and estate taxes.

Depending on the preferences

of the individuals involved, sale of CR and external
financing may not be necessary.
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Monitoring and En:Eorcement
The basic scheme will require that holders of CR
report to the MA their catches at regular intervals.

There

must be an independent check on the catches through buyers
or processors and the MA must keep a running talley of
the catch under each block of catch rights.

Various of the

measures discussed under Refinements would require additional
enforcement measures as noted.
Conclusion
From the preceding discussion it appears that
the catch rights approach would be effective in protecting
the resource, and in protecting the economic viability
of the industry.

The benefits of the measure are incident

on holders of catch rights.

It allows a maximum of flexi-

bility to fishermen in deciding how, when and where to
harvest their catch.

It does not preclude modifi-

cations to improve or refine the utilization of the resource.
In our opinion the catch rights scheme is one of the better
of the limited entry approaches.

It has substantial advant-

ages over the approaches that license vessels and which are
discussed next.

A disadvantage relative to these is that

catches must be carefully monitored to ensure that
individuals do not catch more than their entitlement.
To put this disadvantage in ·perspective however, it
should be noted that some level of catch monitoring is
required in all schemes and is required in order to evaluate
the performance of any scheme.
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FOOTNOTES

1.

PL 94-265,

Sec. 303 (b) (6).
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LICENSING CATCH CAPACITY
Anothe:r basic approach is to match fishing
effort to the aggregate quota by licensing an appropriate
number of catch capacity units to operate in the fishery.
In this scheme, a license would authorize deployment of a
vessel for a unit of time (perhaps a week).
exist.

Several options

Either technological improvements could be restricted

in an attempt to stabilize the number of units of gear
operating, ,or changes could be allowed without restriction,
in which case the number of vessels or amount of fishing
time (or both) would need be reduced over the years.
Additionally, all vessels could be treated equally, or
they could be grouped into categories determined by
characteristics of the vessel and dredge which affect
harvesting efficiency.

Property rights could be assigned

to the licensees or could be retained by the MA.
Implementation
In essence, the appropriate catch level (MSY
or other quota) must be associated with an appropriate
number of effective catch capacity units, and thence,
by arithmetic conversion to an appropriate number of
licenses.

Original distribution of catch capacity units

to members of the fishing industry would involve the
questions and alternatives as discussed under Catch Rights.
Presumably some form of grandfathering formula would be
involved.
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The first step would be to define the catch
capacity unit.

We will use vessel-week in this discussion,

though other units of time could be used.

In the

simplest and perhaps least equitable case all vessels
would be treated equally.

The catch target or quota

would be divided by the average weekly catch of the fleet
to determine the number of weeks of fishing to be allowed.
Each licensee would then be authorized to deploy a
stipulated number of vessel weeks.

The number of vessel

weeks which would approximate the catch target is less
than would occupy the fleet for a full year.

Fishing

could either be restricted to a predetermined part of the
year, or could b,e left to the discretion of the individual
licensees.

Technological improvements over the years

would tend to increase the economic efficiency, and
probably the profits, of the innovators, .but at the cost
of reducing the total amount of fishing time allowed, the
number of vessels, or both.
A somewhat more complex, but perhaps more nearly
equitable method of defining the catch capacity unit would
be to group vessels of the then existing fleet into a
few (3-6) performance categories so that the large stern
dredgers would not be ranked with smaller, older side
dredgers.

Among the performance features to be considered

in categorizing vessels would be vessel size, dredge size,
pump capacity and other features that influence efficiency.
This would be done on the basis of historic performance
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of typical vessels.

Vessel operators would not be allowed

to significantly change their vessels or dredges.

Pre-

cluding improvements would tend to stabilize the number
of vessels operating and the duration of fishing season.
The question of whether the government should
retain property rights in the licenses or should assign
them to the licensee must be addressed.

If assigned to

the licensee, then conditions of exchange must be specified
as in the case with catch rights.

As is the case with

catch rights, effort units should be reasonably small
(vessel-weeks, not vessel months) to .facilitate exchange
and year-to-year adjustments in response to changes in
population.
In summary, the catch target would be converted
from bushels of clams to vessel weeks and licenses issued
entitling holders to deploy the appropriate amount of
effort.

Issuance of licenses involves the same issues

and could be by the same means as discussed under
Catch Rights.
Analysis
The goal of protecting the resource would be
accomplished indirectly by establishing an effort quota
rather than a straight-forward quota on catch.
Because of the various options and suboptions, discussion of the consequences of adopting any
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one set is complicated.

At least eight subsets of options

are possible under this scheme as follows:
roperty rights
assigned to licensee

;vessel license

Property rights
etained by MA
Vessels equa<

~ r o p e r t y rights
ssigned to licensee

3

4

-~

s

<

___-Property rights
assigned to licensee

---- Property rights
~etained by MA

"-..Person licensed
'------....

...---Property rights
assigned to licensee
Property rights
- ----.reta1.ne
. d by MA

The various options would have somewhat differing
impact on the business climate of the industry.

Treating

vessels equally irrespective of size would encourage
elimination of the smaller vessels with an attendant "arms
race" to substitute large vessels capable of high catch
rates.

2

\person l i c e n s e ~
Property rights
etained by MA

/Vessel licensed
Vessels
categorize

1

In turn this increasing catch capacity of the

total fleet, would require a decrease in the number of
vessel weeks in order to avoid exceeding the catch target.
Two effects of the option are economically questionable.
Treating all vessels equally would encourage premature

6

7
8
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replacement of some vessels and would encourage surplus
fishing capacity which would be forced to lie idle part
of each year unless occupied in an alternative fishery
such as that for ocean quahogs.
If vessels were grouped into categories

based

on productivity, there would be less incentive to replace
the less productive vessels.

The competitive positions of

the various categories would be fixed by the system.
There would, however, be an incentive to increase the
catching power of each vessel to the maximum extent allowed
by the classification system.

Therefore the MA would of

necessity becomE? involved in approving or disapproving
proposed modifications of vessels and gear, thus involving
itself in economic decisions of fishermen.

One questions

whether the level of control implicit in this scheme could
be achieved without very extensive input from industry
concerning the E~fficiency of technological improvements,
including mandatory disclosure of information that normally

would be deemed proprietary.
The options of licensing vessels or people also
have economic ramifications which influence the business
climate.

Licensing vessels would tend to stabilize the

number in the fishery, and also the size distribution, if
categorized.

The license would in effect state that tre

vessel John Doe could operate in the fishery for a stipulated
number of weeks.
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Licensing people rather than vessels appears to
offer advantages.

If vessels were licensed the fleet

size would be stabilized, but if people were licensed,
freedom would exist to readjust the number of vessels as
economic conditions dictated.

Licensing people would

encourage attrition from an overcapitalized fleet in that
the number of licensees could be greater than the number
of vessels.

The vessel John Doe could fish the number of

vessel weeks authorized by one license, then fish another
period of time under authorization of another license.
A vessel owner could fish his own license, then contract
with one or more additional license holders.

Thus the

less efficient vessels would tend to leave the fishery
as licensees contracted with operators of the more
efficient.

However no boat operator would be forced out

by the government if he started off with a license.

Each

license holder would make the decision, within the context
of his own business, of whether to operate his own boat

or to contract with another boat owner.
If the MA retains property rights, it must
establish a procedure for redistribution of licenses
that become inactive through .forfeiture, retirement or
death of the licensee, or otherwise.

Although licenses

presumably would be valuable, the MA is precluded by
PL 94-265 from distributing them by auction.

Establishment

of criteria whereby a limited number of licenses could
be equitably assigned among a large group of applicants
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seems an insurmountable task .. Lottery seems to be the
best means of assignment.
If property rights are assigned to the licensees
then decisions concerning expansion or contraction of each
individual fishing operation would be made internally within
the context of the economics of the industry rather than
externally in the arroa of the management agency.

Down-

ward adjustment of fishing effort would be facilitated
by private ownership of licenses in that not only the
vessels, but also the right to fish would be salable
commodities.

If only the vessel were an economic asset,

people would be: inclined to remain in the fishery as long
as possible, especially as the vessel became more
antiquated (less salable), whereas if the right to fish
were marketable:, the owner of an old vessel might be
disposed to scrap the vessel and sell or lease the
license.
If property rights were assigned, then industry
would have considerable degree of freedom in adjusting
the number of vessels actually fishing.

Depending on the

constraints placed on ownership of licenses, a single
vessel owner might contract to fish the licenses of several
different people.

Licenses need not be tied to specific

vessels or, in fact, to ownership of any vessel.
Monitoring and Enforcement
Enforcement would involve inspection to
determine that each vessel was operating under a valid
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license.

The MA would also need to monitor the design

characteristics and catch of each vessel for the purpose
of detecting changes in effective catch capacity.
Because total catch would be controlled by
limiting catch capacity, the MA would need to issue
licenses and the authority to prohibit improvements to
technical efficiency, or to link their adoption to
reductions in fleet size or fishing season.
Conclusion
A scheme based on licensing catch capacity could,
in principle, be successful in protecting the resource and
the economic viability of the fishery.

However, in order

to implement and enforce such a scheme the MA would have
to prohibit technological improvements or link their adoption
to reductions in fleet size or duration of the fishing
season.

While this is possible in principle we suspect

that in practice it would prove onerous to industry and
the MA.

In practice such a scheme might tend to simply

prohibit innovation even when innovations are cost-saving
and socially desirable.
The catch rights scheme authorizes a licensee.
to take a specified quantity ·Of the resource.

In contrast

the catch capacity scheme authorizes licensees to deploy
a specified quantity of fishing effort.

Both could protect

the resource, both could protect the industry, but the
catch capacity :scheme would be more costly to administer
and might depending on the option taken, preclude or discourage innovation.
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LICENSING VESSELS
A licensing scheme based on vessels warrants some
consideration.

This scheme would issue licenses to a

pre-determined number of standard fishing vessels.

The

harvest quota would be regulated indirectly through the
number of vesseils.

The industry would be stabilized

by the limitation on the number of vessels.
Implementation
The plan would divide all existing vessels into
a few ( 3 to 6) categories based on their capacity to
catch clams.
described.

These categories would be defined and
Only vessels fitting into one of the categories

could be considered for licensing and new vessels could
be licensed only upon retirement of an existing one.

To

accomplish the initial effort reduction, the appropriate
number of licenses could be bought back and retired.

A

fisherman could, in general, buy out another in order to
expand his total vessel capacity.

Such ownership changes

might however be subject to review to avoid excessive
concentration.

Long-term changes in the resource would

be met by adjusting the number of licenses.

Short term

changes could be addressed by adjusting the length of the
season.
Property rights in the licenses could either
be retained by the management authority or be passed to the
licensee.

If passed to the licensee, questions and
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alternatives would be the same as in the case of Catch
Rights.
Mechanisms would be needed to retire vessels
and to allow additional vessels into the fishery in response to long-·term changes in the resource.

Probably

the MA would buy up licenses (and perhaps vessels) in
order to retire them and would issue new licenses by
lottery.
Analysis
The degree to which total catch approximated the
desired quota would depend upon the accuracy with which the
fishing efficiency of various vessel-gear combinations and
arrangements could be approximated.

Rather detailed reviews

by the MA of vessel efficiency and characteristics would
be required.

A stable business climate could be provided,

but at the cost of constantly attempting to stabilize
effort through number of licensed vessels.
An obvious difficulty in this approach is that of
knowing whether a given change in gear or vessel design is
merely routine maintenance or if it will increase catch
capacity beyond that allocated to the particular category
of vessel.

If, for example, .a fisherman replaces an

unreliable engine with a new one, will the replacement have
the same thrust as the old?

Since additional licenses

would have to be purchased from other fishermen, the least
expensive way will frequently be to invest in technologies
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and gear which increase the catch capacity of existing
vessels.

For example, the industry might invest in a

"factory ship" for offshore processing to release more
time for dredging operations by dredge boats.
This plan·is similar to Licensing Catch Capacity
differing only in terms of the precision with which "effort"
is regulated.

However this difference is important for

efficient vessel and gear design, incentives for technological improvement and the costs of management.

In order to

closely approximate the annual catch quota, the management
authority would have to hold fishing capacity at a fixed
level.

This would require becomming enmeshed in decisions

or actions which are normally the exclusive province of
private enterprise.

The MA would need to authorize and

monitor any proposed changes in vessels or gear which
might affect fishing efficiency.

This understandably would

not sit well with fishermen and could be a costly management
system to implement, monitor and enforce.
Exchange of licenses would be less readily
accomplished in this scheme than in the preceding ones in
that licenses would be more costly.

The relatively high

.value of licenses would likely make the industry less
fluid and encourage consolidation into a smaller number
of larger operating units.

Only well-capitalized units

(corporations) would be able to participate readily
in the market for licenses.
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Monitoring and Enforcement
Enforcement would consist of inspecting for valid
licenses and inspecting modification of vessels or gear to
monitor changes over time in catch capacity.

The MA would

need to monitor total catch and catch per unit of effort
to ensure that the catch approximated the desired quota and
to determine if adjustments in quota or class criteria
were needed.
Conclusion
Limiting the number of vessels operating in the
fishery could satisfy the goal of protecting the resource,
in that the catch target could be approximated within an
acceptable margin of error.

Margin of error could be

reduced by adjusting the length of the fishing season.
Monitoring and enforcement requirements would perhaps be
somewhat less than in the other schemes.

The value of

licenses might be so great as to result in a very limited
market and hence lead to major consolidation within the
industry over ti.me.
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I

REFINEMENTS

While a program applying to the entire fishing
area from Montauk Point to Cape Hatteras without geographic
sub-division or other regulation might be adopted as a
starting point, refinement is desirable.

Some additional

provisions, such as size limits, area and seasonal closures,
while of themselves inadequate as management actions, could
be incorporated in any of the preceding plans to improve
its efficiency.

Size limits should be established to

obtain the maximum yield per recruit.

Benefits would

likely accrue from harvesting offshore beds during seasons
of relatively calm seas and retaining inshore beds for
harvesting during winter.
next.

These provisions are discussed

Additional work will be necessary to determine the

feasibility of incorporating these features.

The important

point to recognize is that such refinements are complimentary rather than mutually exclusive and need not be
instituted simultaneously with other provisions.
Size Limits
It is biologically unsound to harvest clams
before they have spawned.

Also it is economically un-

sound to harvest young, rapidly growing clams, which if
left on the bottom for an additional period of growth
would yield a greater quantity of meat.

The most lucrative

time to harvest is at the size of maximum yield per recruit.
Surf clams attain sexual maturity at an age of one or two
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years.

Although the data are not· precise, maximum yield

per recruit would appear to be attained at an age of
from four to eight years, when clams are from 4.5 to
5.5 inches long.

In the offshore waters where growth is

rapid, maximum yield probably would be attained near 5.5
inches, but in nearshore waters where growth is slower a
smaller size might provide the greatest yield.

Natural

mortality rate is not known at this time.
Both data from research cruises and information
from people familiar with the operation of vessels dredging
clams commercially indicate that frequently clams in one
bed are of predominately one size.

Beds containing both

large and small clams in appreciable numbers do exist
however.

Data now at hand do not indicate which type bed

occurs most commonly.

The size uniformity within beds is

important for the effectiveness of a size regulation as
discussed below.

A dredge probably kills some clams

washed free of the bottom in its path.

Therefore a

size limit seemingly could result in destruction of significant quantities of small clams if beds containing clams
of all sizes were dredged.

If, however, sorting proved

financially infeasible, vessel operators would seek out
beds of large clams, and conservation might be well served.
Beds containing small clams would be left undisturbed until
they grew to the legally harvestable size thus maximizing
yield per recruit.

so

A morie general question may be raised however.
There are ground:; for suspecting that even under the best of
circumstances, :size regulations, unless accompanied by
limited entry mieasures will be of zero or trivial permanent
benefit to fish1ermen. An intuitive statement of this result
is as follows.

Optimum size regulations will increase

potential yield and potential economic benefits because they
maximize yield for a fixed level of fishing mortality.

Under

open access conditions, however, this induces an effort
supply response.

The increase in fishing effort induces an

increase in fishing mortality to the point where the potential
gains are vitiated. A case study in which this result was
1
demonstrated quantitatively is Gates and Norton (1974).
In prospecting for clams of harvestable size,
a captain would be likely to capture some small clams.
The management plan should perhaps attempt to minimize the.
wastage of small clams taken inadvertently by allowing
the landing of a small quantity of undersized clams.

The

desirability of avoiding waste must be balanced against
the undesirability of encouraging directed fishing on beds
of small clams.

If an allowable tolerance of small clams

per trip came to be considered as a quota or catch target,
conservation would be poorly served.

Probably the safest

course is to start with a rather stringent tolerance limit
and to relax the restriction if experience shows this to
be desirable.
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One problem with "knife-edged" regulations on
size is

that they do not recognize the probabilistic

nature of the harvest.

Under the best of intentions, the

quota on undersized clams may be exceeded on an occasional,
random chance basis.

When this happens, to discard the

excess makes sense only if the survival rate for discards
is quite high.

An alternative would be to place a tax

on the excess.

The level of the tax would be set so that

it is in fishermens interest to search for large clams
because of a substantially higher profit margin.

At the

same time, given a random catch of undersized clams, the
tax should be low enough that retention is preferred to
discarding the excess.

Such a strategy encourages fishing

strategies to avoid small clams but avoids waste of
inadvertent catches.
Imposition of a size limit alone would do
nothing to discourage overcapitalization.

Some method of

limiting entry or assigning property rights would be needed
to provide stability to the industry.
Area Closures
Prohibition of harvest in certain areas, at
least during part of the year, could be used as an
additional refinement.

Closure would be to allow growth

of undersized clams or to reserve beds in protected waters
for harvest during winter when harsh weather disrupts work
offshore.

In the latter case the closure would be seasonal.
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Area closures might complement size limits in the
attempt to maximize the yield per recruit.

If vessels

harvest beds having populations of several sizes and the
small clams are culled from the catch, wastage will be
significant because survival is poor when clams are returned to the water after being dredged up.

Therefore,

to the extent that area closures could be enforced, it
would seem desirable to prohibit harvest from beds having
appreciable numbers of clams smaller than the size that
gives maximum yield.
It must be recognized that enforcement would be
difficult and costly especially at night and at some
distance from shore.
Area closures would be ineffective as the sole
management tool because overcapitalization would not be
prevented.

Nevertheless, area closures offer promise as a

complement to other management measures.

There is another

important, though subtle, cost of area measures which are
imperfectly enforced.

If area restrictions are circumvented

byrnisstating the grid in which harvest actually occurred
then scientific analysis of catch data by

area may be

rendered meaningless.
At the same time, the necessity of area closures
(other than possibly spawning sanctuaries) may be questioned
on the grounds of redundancy.

The geographic allocation

of fishing effort may be viewed as a predator-prey process
in which re-allocation toward areas with highest stock
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abundance is an automatic, dynamic process.

Thus, closure

of depleted beds may be regarded by fishermen as a nice,
innocuous management me.asure because they have no intention
of fishing in such areas except for sampling purposes.
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FOOTNOTES
1.

Gates, John M. and Virgil J. Norton. 1974. The
Benefits of Fisheries Regulation: A Case Study of the
New England Yellowtail Flounder Fishery. University of
Rhode Island Marine Technical Report No. 21.
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SOME CRITERIA FOR APPRAISING MANAGEMENT SCHEMES
The many facets of limited entry schemes suggest
that more than one criterion is appropriate in appraising
them.

Specifically, an appraisal should consider (1)

the incidence of benefits and costs both economic and
social, (2) implications for technological improvements,
(3) flexibility to respond to changes in costs, prices and
resource abundance, (4) the costs of management, and (5)
efficient use of labor and capital.

We will review these

criteria briefly in this section and relate each to the
three basic types of limited entry schemes.

An over-

riding issue of feasibility within existing laws and
institutions, i.s discussed in Part· II.
The best scheme is one which maintains the resource
in perpetuity and le aves to the private sector

maximum

flexibility in decisions concerning social and economic
issues.

The management authority must be careful to

distinguish between providing the opportunity for the private
sector to. make social and economic decisions and ignoring
social and economic issues.

Too often in the past governmental

managers have not left flexibility, but instead by ignoring
issues, have actually forced.certain social or economic
consequences.

Outstanding among these has been the over-

capitalization forced by open access to common property
fisheries resources.
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Incidence of Benefits and Costs
Benefits from entry limitation in either of the
licensing approaches would accrue directly to fishermen.
Some of this could, however, be appropriated by the
management authority through licensing or leasing fees or
through a tax on catch.

It would seem judicious to

impose a temporary effort moratorium before instituting
these management schemes.

If potential profits are deemed

great enough, s:peculators may attempt to enter the fishery
just before a licensing scheme is implemented.
Certainly the question of "fairness" of the
initial distribution of access in a limited entry scheme
is of great importance to fishermen.

Unfortunately,

perceptions of fairness will vary among people and over
time.

The complexities which may arise in achieving

fairness are very great.
Regarding economic and social issues, a management scheme should allow and encourage decision-making by
the people and companies participating in the fishery
rather than by the management agency.

In this regard the

best plan is the one which provides to the fishermen the
greatest flexibility and greatest range of options possible
within the fundamental constraints of the resource.
Especially to be guarded against is the resource-oriented

provision which accidentally or incidentally narrows or
forecloses social or economic options.
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In general it is true that the power to make
socio-economic decisions is greatly enhanced by property
rights.

Thus those schemes which assign property rights

to licensees would give to the fishermen greater decisionmaking power than those in which the property rights are
retained by the MA.

Additionally the catch rights scheme

would appear to require fewer restraints than the other
property-rights options.
Implications for Technological Improvements
It seems probable that fishermen will be
interested in a scheme which allows the more efficient
inventive, or industrious individuals opportunity to
advance their position.

If so, then the regulatory scheme

should allow returns to initiative and to operational
improvements, as in any other industry, rather than
restricting methods and technologies which could increase
efficiency and lower costs.
Under the licensing of catch capacities, it
would be desirable to ensure incentive for innovation.
Suppose all effort were indexed, as described earlier,
and an appropriate number of standardized effort units
were licensed to each participating firm.

Then, if one

individual wishes to make an operational improvement, the
management authority could require him either to retire
some of his own effort or to buy out someone else.' s
licenses to·compensate for the effective effort increase
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inherent in his innovation.

In either case, he is

potentially reducing the costs of harvesting any given
quantity of clams and so it will be worth his while to
make the innovation only if cost savings are sufficient
to warrant buying some vessel-weeks.
Note that under a licensing of vessels scheme,
the only way in which the management authority can combat
the effort increases of technological change is by buying
back licenses and retiring entire vessels.
Under the catch rights approach, there is always
incentive to innovate, i.e., to catch one's quota at a
lower cost.

Consequently, operational improvements will

always be sought - without altering the total amount of
clams caught.

The additional profits forthcoming from the

improvement will accrue to those who adopt it, but such
improvements will not alter total catch and hence will not
diminish the catch per unit effort of other fishermen.
It is possible that the initial distribution of rights will,
for some fishermen, be too smallto achieve the economies
of size attendant in large vessel operation.

A free

market in catch rights could serve to mitigate this problem
as well; the returns from large-scale operations may be
sufficient incentive for the more enterprising to bid
licenses away from others.

Indeed, were this not so,

there would be no basis for concern about undue concentration of rights as mentioned earlier.

Thus, the

conservation effects of catch rights are the same as
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those of an idealized system for licensing standardized units
of effort.

However, the catch rights approach does not

require continual assessment of factors influencing effort
as is necessary in the effort licensi~g scheme.
Flexibility under Changing Conditions
Changes will be introduced into the regulated
fishery from various sources which suggest the need for
flexibility in the various components of an overall
management plan, including limited entry components.
An increase in demand with fixed or shrinking supplies
will increase prices.

No adjustments are necessary in either

the licensing of catch capacity or catch rights.

Under

these approache:s, effort and catch do not respond to price
changes in the short-run.

The short-run effect of price

increases is simply an increase in the profits of fishermen.
If the licensing of vessels (only) approach were used,
however, then each time market conditions changed, there

would be an incentive for firms to increase their catch
by whatever means possible.

These might include larger

dredge, overtime crews, offshore processing etc.

As

noted earlier, the only adjustment mechanism available under
this plan would be the continued buy-back and retirement of
vessels and/or a complementary quota scheme to stabilize
catch.
Alternatively, a change in the status of the
stocks or the management authority's perception of that
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status will involve adjustments similar to those required
in the initial phase of an effort limitation scheme.

In

the catch capacity licensing approach flexibility could
be achieved by adjusting the length of the fishing season
or by reducing the number of licensed effort units in poor
years and increasing them in good years.

Reductions could

be achieved by refusing to renew more than the prescribed
number, by purchase of excess effort units or by temporary
lease (by the MA) of excess effort units.

Similarly in

the catch rights approach, excess rights can be handled by
scaling down all rights proportionately, by purchase
of excess rights, or by lease of excess rights.

In

either approach, reduction (or increases) in the total
catch can be allocated among individuals and this allocation
need not be compulsory.

Use of voluntary market means

are possible provided a revenue base exists which the
management authority can use to buy or lease the desired
excess.

Presumably those fishermen most willing to sell

or lease would include the less efficient at fishing,
including those whose opportunity costs (non-fishing
employment opportunities) are highest.
Cost of Management
Another criterion for appraisal of limited entry
schemes is their administrative complexity and costs.

The

costs of management include funds designated for research
and monitoring of stocks.

This work would probably
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be done for resource oriented management measures with
or without limited entry.

In addition, there are the

expenses of the limited entry scheme per se, i.e.,
administrative, compensation, enforcement, etc.

The

cost of managememt is important in a time of scarce public
funds.

It is in the interest of fishermen, consumers

and taxpayers to ensure that a given management measure
be adopted only if the benefits exceed the costs of
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement.
Resource assessment and monitoring the catch
would cost nearly the same irrespective of the type of
plan.

The various schemes which assign property rights would

be expensive to implement, but then private enterprise
would take over the exchange of licenses with the management
agency having only to record transfers in order to maintain
an accurate record of ownership.
would not be great.

Thus the long-term costs

Probably the least costly schemes

would be Catch Rights and the simplest Catch Capacity

option.

Cost would increase with the need to monitor or

prohibit changes in vessels and gear.
Efficient Use of Labor and Capital
The efficiency of limited entry schemes has
already received some discussion under implications for
technological improvements.

In addition to these criteria,

a management scheme should permit efficient use of labor
and capital in both the harvesting and processing sectors.
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An aggregate annual quota plan without limited entry
provisions would, for example, result in overcapitalization and a race to catch as many clams as possible before
the aggregate quota is exhausted.

Once the quota is

exhausted, vessels and processing capacity would be idle
for the balance of the year.

An effect of such a scheme

in isolation could be excessive supplies at the beginning
of the fishing season and a dearth of supplies later in
the season.

This would represent an inefficient use of

labor and capital.
Another dimension of efficient use of labor and
capital concerns the effect of limited entry measures on
the choice of harvest systems.

The dimension is best

illustrated by considering a vessel licensing system.

With

a limited number of licenses, fishermen will look for methods
which increase catch without requiring additional licenses.
The ingenuity of private enterprise in such situation is
marvelous.

Unfortunately, innovations will not necessarily

result in the least costly harvest system.

Excessive re-

sources (labor and capital) will be devoted to increasing
the innovators catch per vessel per day.

Unfortunately,

the gain to the innovator is at the expense of other fishermen.

Over time as imitators adopt the innovations, the

gains which were initially apparent to innovators will
vanish.

On the other hand, innovations which permit a

fisherman to harvest the same catch at lower cost are desirable for everyone since they will not diminish the total catch.
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MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS UNSUITED TO THE SURF CLAM FISHERY
For the sake of completeness, a few concepts
are presented h«=re which, although applied with greater
or lesser degree of success in some other fisheries, seem
inappropriate to the surf clam fishery.
Leasing Bottom for Harvest of Clams
Under this concept the MA would lease the exclusive
right to harvest shellfish from numerous defined tracts as
is done with tracts for petroleum exploration and development.

For those states involved in the surf clam fishery,

state control over submerged lands stops at a point three
miles from shore.

Any management plan calling for bottom

leasing would require participation by the Federal Government since a significant quantity of the resource exists
in submerged land beyond the three mile limit.
Allowing each lessee to manage the harvest
from the leased bottoms as he deemed to be in his best
interest would have the advantage of requiring little
governmental regulation once the tracts were leased.

How-

ever, the surveillance system needed to hold piracy to a
reasonable minimum would be so costly as to make this
plan of highly doubtful value.

There is the additional

problem of determining what activities the lessee could
conduct and what rights others would have to use the
leased area.
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In short, although appealing in concept leasing
seems impractical in the surf clam fishery.
Catch Limits
Although catch limits (i.e. catch per vessel per
day or per week) are imposed in many fisheries, this
procedure appears poorly suited to the surf clam fishery.
Catch limits alone would neither control the total annual
harvest nor contribute to a stable business climate in
the long term.
The approach would be to establish the maximum
;

allowable catch for each vessel for each day or other
period of time (week or month).

Presumably the manage-

ment agency would at the outset establish the daily catch
limit so that the total annual catch approximated the
MSY (or other catch target).

The broad range in fishing

power of vessels now operating presents a problem in
arriving at suitable limits.

The smallest vessels are

capable of taking on the order of 100 bu per day whereas
the most effective stern dredgers are capable of taking
up to 3000 bu/day.

It would be unreasonable to apply one

catch limit to all units of the fleet.

The limit might

be based on carrying capacity of the vessels or on width
of dredge (so many bushels per inch of dredge width per
day).
The weaknesses of this approach are that it
fails to control total harvest, that it mitigates against
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efficient harvesting techniques, and that it encourages
the "arms race" climate.

If any number of additional boats

could be brought into the fishery, the daily limit would
provide no control over total harvest.

Any processor

having a market for more clams could buy, build, or
contract with additional vessels.

Additional vessels

would enter the fishery until it became unprofitable and
the stock became overfished.

Indeed, the need to even

consider such limits implies the existence of excessive
effort.

Moreover, there are difficulties, as mentioned

above, in establishing limits which recognize differences
between vessel catch capacities in an equitable way.
Quotas
Establishing MSY as a total catch limitation is
a regulatory mechanism that has been applied in a few
fisheries, for example the Pacific halibut, and yellowfin tuna fisherh!s.

While a quota satisfactorily protects

the resource, this type of regulation does not provide the
sort of business climate in which one can make long-term
investment decisions.

In short, it foster the business approach

of "get all you can while you can", which in turn leads to
overcapitalization and unsatisfactory profits.

Thus a quota

fails the object:i.v,e of protecting the industry.
Dividing the quota among various geographic
areas improves the biological aspect, but does not resolve
the arms race problem of excessive effort.

In addition,
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effort tends to re-deploy from areas of low success to
areas to high success.

Consequently, area quotas at

best will tend merely to sanction what would have taken
place any way.
Gear Regulations
The eoncept behind gear regulation seemingly is
that if only inefficient gear is allowed, overfishing
will be prevented by the high cost of harvesting.

Thus

a management agency might limit the size of dredge or size
or type of vessel that could be used to harvest clams.
This approach would not meet the goal of protecting the
industry or minimizing costs and is not likely to protect
the resource.

It should be noted that the economics of

regulated inefficience are very similar to a user fee or
tax.

Profits are reduced by increasing costs instead of

reducing revenues.

The end effect can be to prevent

over-exploitation but only if the degree of inefficiency
is increased enough to remove the profit margin which
attracts additional effort.

The resultant "conservation

by cost" is still wasteful however in that the same
amount of product could have been delivered at less cost
via efficient harvest technology and limited entry.

PART II
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT REGIMES
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INTRODUCTION
The surf clam fishery encompasses an area off
the coasts of several eastern states, primarily New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia.

At the

northernmost range of the fishery, surf clam beds are
found close inshore.

As one moves south, however, the

beds are found progressively further offshore, ultimately
far beyond the present United States territorial sea.
Both the operation of the industry and the distribution
pattern of the resource make the development of an
effective management plan difficult.
In the pas~ there has been little effective
cooperation among the states or between the states and
the Federal Govi~rnment in developing a management plan for
the surf clam f:ishery.

Jurisdictional authority has

been fragmented among the several states and the Federal
Government.

Prior to the passage of the Fishery Conserva-

tion and Management Act of 1976,

1

the Federal Government

lacked a clear mandate regarding the management and
regulation of domestic fishing.
On April 13, 1976, .the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act was signed into law and this marked the
beginning of a significant new period in the history of
the United States fisheries.

Now,new authority is vested

in the Federal Government for management and regulation
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of domestic and foreign fishing interest.

This

new legislation, although providing an improved management and regulatory framework, has not completely resolved
previously existing problems and has created a unique set
of new problems.
The goals of the legal portion of this study
will be to analyze the present legal framework for management, identify potential legal impediments associated with
the establishiment of various management proposals, and
identify possible alternative mechanisms for the development of an effe!ctive management regime.
THE PRESENT JURISDICTIONAL STATUS OF THE
SURF CLAM FISHERY
The present management framework is a blend
of the old and the new.

However, the key to understand-

ing present state and federal roles in fishery management
is the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976.
The surf clam fishery is less complex than
other fisheries since it has never been subject to
recreational or foreign fishing.

Although jurisdiction is

the province of the federal and state governments, more
than two simple zones of jurisdiction are involved.
The surf clam fishery involves these legally
defined zones of jurisdiction: the internal waters of the
states; the territorial seas of the states; the high seas;
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the fishery conservation zone; and the continental shelf.
These zones serve different jurisdictional purposes and
while some are separate and distinct, others overlap.

By

way of definition, the internal waters of a state are
those waters landward of the innermost boundary of the
territorial se,:1.

The territorial sea runs from an inter-

nationally accepted baseline along our coast out to a
distance of three miles and this three mile belt or'
jurisdiction parallel to the coast is divided into separate
areas of state jurisdiction.
Beyond the territorial sea lies the high seas
from which a special area of jurisdiction, the fishery
conservation zone, has be carved.

The fishery conservation

zone, extending 197 miles beyond the outermost limit of the
territorial sea, exist only for purposes of fishery
management and conservation and leaves intact, where applicable,
2
other freedoms associated with the high seas.
The continental shelf, as defined under U. S.
and international law, means the seabed and subsoil adjacent
to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea,
to a depth of 200 meters or beyond to where the depth of
the superadjacent water admits of the exploration of the
natural resources of such areas.3

As one might logically

expect the degree of state control over any zone parallels
the physical proximity of the zone to the state.

States have

more authority over fisheries in internal waters than in
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territorial seas, and even less authority beyond the
territorial sea.
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976 (FCMA) creiated a fishery conservation zone (FCZ) for
waters 197 nautical miles beyond the seaward boundary of each
of the coastal states of the United States. 4 FCMA became
effective on March 1, 1977 and vests in the United States
exclusive management authority over all fish within the
fishery conservation zone, and all continental shelf
fishery resources beyond the FCZ, as well as providing for
United States jurisdiction over anadromous species except
when they enter waters under the jurisdiction of other
nations.

At the international level, no claims of

sovereignty in the waters in this zone are made and no
interference with recognized legitimate uses of the high
seas, except as are necessary to implement fishery management and conservation, are authorized by the Act. 5 The
states retain most of their traditional rights in relation
to fishery regulation under the new Act.
StatE~ jurisdiction over fisheries is
recognized in common law principles, court decision,
and both state and federal legislation. 6 State jurisdiction has beEm recognized to extend not only to internal
and territorial waters of a state but also to include
State vessels and citizens on the high seas operating
beyond state territorial waters. 7

Through landing
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regulation states have also acted to control non-resident
8
fishing activities.
It must be remembered that such
state authority has been and will continue to be subject
to the exercise of certain paramount federal powers.
Under FCMA state authority over internal waters
is reserved completely to the states while state authority
over territorial waters is reserved to the states subject
to certain exceptions.

State jurisdiction over its vessels

and citizens beyond territorial waters remain possible
only if there is no conflict with regulatiomwithin the FCZ.
State control over non-residents is now at issue before the
Supreme Court and is also questionable under FCMA.

The

portion of FCMA, pertinent to state jurisdiction is Section
306 and it s ta t,2s:
.
(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), nothing in this Act shall be construed
as extending or diminishing the jurisdiction or
authority of any State within its boundaries. No
State may directly or indirectly regulate any
fishing which is engaged in by any fishing vessel
outside its boundaries, unless such vessel is
registered under the laws of such State.
(b)

Exception.-- (1) If the Secretary finds ...
that-(A) the fishing in a fishery, which
is covered by a fishery management plan
implemented under this Act, is engaged in
predominantly within the fishery conservation zone and beyond such zone; and
(B) any State has taken any action,
or omitted to take any action, the results
of which will substantially and adversely
affect the carrying out of such fishery
management plan;
the S,ecretary shall promptly notify such State and
the appropriate Council of such finding and of his
intention to regulate the applicable fishery within
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the boundaries of such State (other than its
internal waters), pursuant to such fishery
management plan and the regulations promulgated
to implement such plan.
(2) If the Secretary ... finds that the
reasons for which he assumed such regulation no
longer prev~il, he shall promptly terminate such
regulation.
The .Act reaffirms the right of a state to regulate
fishing even beiyond its territorial waters where its own
citizens or vessels are involved.

However, the FCMA also

seems to limit a state's control beyond the three mile waters
to these instances and cjrcumstances alone.

By forbidding

a state to "directly or indirectly" regulate fishing beyond
its boundaries, excepting the above two instances, the FCMA
makes extended state regulation aimed at nonresidents and
effected through landing laws dubious in validity.
Furthermore, if federal regulation in the conserva ..
tion zone is exercised, even permissible extended state
regulation which conflicted with it would have to yield
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.

Even without

conflict, federal regulation in a particular area might pre-

empt exercise of state power in the same area.
The Act is to be administered by eight regional
councils: New England, Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, Caribbean, Gulf, Pacific, North Pacific, and Western Pacific. 10
Each council will be composed of voting and non-voting
members.

Voting members will include: the chief state

official with marine fishery management responsibility and
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expertise in each constituent state, designated as such by
the Governor; the regional director of the National Marine
Fisheries Service for the geographic area concerned, or
his designee, except that if two such regional directors
exist for one council area, the Secretary of Commerce shall
designate which of the two shall be the voting member; and
at least one qualified individual appointed by the Secretary
from each state:, selected from lists submitted by the
11
Governor of eac:h State.
]~on-voting members will include:
the regional or area director of the United States Fish and
Wildlife Servic:e for the geographical area, or his designee;
the commander for the Coast Guard district involved,
or his designeei, except that if two Coast Guard districts
are within the area the person designated by the commandant
of the Coast Guard shall serve; the executive director of
the Marine Fisheries Commission for the area concerned, or
his designee; one representative of the Department of State,
designated by the Secretary of State, or his designee. 12
Each Council is to reflect the expertise and
interest of the various constituent states (or territories)
in the ocean area over which such Council is granted authority.
Management plans for the fisheries subject to FCMA regulation
can be initiated by the Regional Councils or by the Secretary
14
of Commerce,
but in either case the plans must meet
certain prescribed national standards and aims listed in
15
the Act.
The enumerated standards concern prevention of
overfishing, achieving the optimum yield, relying on the

13
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best scientific and academic information available, management of fish throughout their migratory range, treatment of
interrelated stocks as a single unit where possible and
conveneient, non-descrimination between residents of different
states or territories, promotion of efficiency, recognition
and allowance for the contingencies involved in fishery
resources and catches, and the minimization of costs with
16
reference to the other goals.
Where a regional council prepares a fishery plan,
it must be submitted to the Secretary of Commerce who is
required to review it within sixty days and notify the
council of approval, disapproval, or partial disapproval.
If the Secretary objects to all or part of a management
scheme, he must state his grounds for objection, suggest
improvements, and request that the council make the necessary
modifications.

If the council fails to prepare a plan or

to alter a faulty one, the Secretary may prepare a fishery
management plan.

The Secretary should then submit his

plan to the council for suggestions, but he is not bound to
alter his plan should the council receive it with criticism.
Again, the Secretary's plan must conform with the same

.
1 stan dar d s enumerate d f or t h e regiona
·
1 counci·1 s.
nationa

17

The surf clam is one of the enumerated fisheries
subject to the conservation and management provis.ions of
18
the FCMA.
Power granted under the FCMA will be used to
regulate the surf clam fishery beyond state territorial
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waters within the conservation zone.

Whether federal

power will be used even within state waters as provided
19
by Section 306 (b) remains to be seen.
Certainly the
FCMA has laid the groundwork for a vigorous federal
program of fishery management.
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SPECIFIC LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
United States Constitution
Introduction
It is clear to most observers that any effective
scheme for the management and conservation of fisheries
•

resources must include limiting the amount of fishing
effort.

It is imperative to consider the legal impli-

cations of such a management policy before attempting
to formulate or implement any specific plan.
In establishing any limited entry program, free
access to the re:source will be restricted.

This creates

the possibility that persons who were previously taking
as much of the resource as they desired migh~ challenge
the program.

Their challenge would most likely rest on

due process and/or equal.protection grounds under the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution,
and on any similar provisions of state constitutions.

It

is important, therefore, to examine due process and equal
protection standards in order to be able to satisfy
constitutional requirements in formulating a program.
In brief, a person who feels aggrieved by a
limited entry scheme would claim (1) that he was deprived
of property (the fish, or the right to catch the fish
and make a living) without due process of law; and (2)
that the program, because of the standards it used in
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deciding what quantities could be taken and which participants would be allowed to take them, discriminated against
him, violating his right to equal protection under the law.
Thus any .restriction on access to the resource might
trigger the due process claim while the charge of violation of equal protection will be directed at the classifications and standards for allocating the restricted amount
of resource.

\~ith this as background, the way these two

provisions are interpreted and applied by the United States
Supreme Court will be summarized.
Due Process
The clause reads:

" . . . nor shall any state

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law . . . " To satisfy this provision,
(1) legislation must be aimed at a legitimate object of
state regulation, and (2) the method chosen to achieve
the legitimate end must bear a reasonable relationship
to that end.

Put in limited entry terms, the key

questions would be (1) is economic regulation or conservation of the fishery a legitimate object of state regulation, and (2) does a limited entry program bear a reasonable relationship to conservation of the fishery?
With respect to the first question, conservation
of resources has been established as a legitimate object
.L •
1
f or state regu.ation.

Promoting sound economic manage-

ment of a fish,:'!ry has also been held to be a legitimate
purpose for state regulation. 2
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The second question cannot be answered by simply
showing that re!ducing access to the resource will conserve
it, although careful biological and economic proof will help
sustain any limited entry legislation.

The problem is

the extent to which government regulation may interfere
with the right to engage in a particular economic activity.
To decide this, the Court will balance the hardship to
some individuals against the public benefit.

Where the

public benefit is clearly and positively served, the Court
will tolerate severe restrictions on individual activities.
For example, the federal courts upheld a Maryland statute
which, in effect, eliminated the commercial menhaden
fishery in state waters by prohibiting the use of purse
nets in Maryland waters.3

Maryland had enacted the

prohibition to promote sport fishing, and the Court respected
the State's judgements that (a) sport fishing should be
encouraged, and (b) that the most efficient way to achieve
this end was prohibition of purse nets.

Interference

with an economic activity will not of itself bar state
regulation as long as the regulation is clearly for the
public benefit .
Equal Protection
The clause reads:

" . . . nor shall any state

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."

As with due process, this clause

breaks down into two aspects:

(1) is there a legitimate
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public purpose involved, and (2) is the classification
within the statute reasonably related to the purpose of
the statute.

As discussed above, conservation of

fisheries is a legitimate public purpose.
The federal courts have two standards for equal
protection, the strict scrutiny test and the rational
relationship test.

When a statute involves a fundamental

right (e.g., spieech, vote, religion) or the basis of the
classification is inherently suspect (e.g., race, religion),
the statute will be strictly scrutinized and will be upheld
only if there i:s a compelling state reason for making the
classification.

This is a very hard test to satisfy.

Limited entry should not trigger the strict scrutiny test,
however, since :it will not involve a fundamental right
nor should it involve a suspect classification.
The standard which will be applied is the rational
relationship test, where a classification will be held valid
if it has some relevance to the purpose of the act.

Put

in limited entry terms, since the aim of the program is
conservation and economic regulation of a fishery, any
standards and classifications must relate to that end.
For example, restricting access only to red-headed fishermen would be um~easonable and not related to the aim of
the statute.

On the other hand, a lottery system where

all those with the same qualifications had an equal
chance to gain E~ntry would probably be upheld.
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The key to equal protection is that similarly
situated individuals must be treated the same.

The

Supreme Court grants legislatures great discretion in
classifying groups for equal protection purposes. 4

In

addition, legislation carries a presumption of constitutionality, so the federal courts will try to avoid overturning
legislation if reasonable justification can support it.
As a general proposition, the federal courts will tolerate
fishery regulation that is not arbitrary, unreasonable
or clearly discriminatory.
In formulating a particular limited entry statute
it would be useful to consider the present Alaska limited
entry act. 5 Thi.s act carefully set standards for deciding
which fishermen would get permits, setting classifications
on the basis of economic dependence on the fishery, past
participation in the fishery, and ability and intent to
participate in the fishery.

Well planned classifications

which consider the needs of the industry as well as the
fishery will satisfy equal protection.
Summary
The constitutional standards of due process and
equal protection are not mathematical formulas which can
be applied to a statute to give a positive yes or no
answer regarding its validity.

They are flexible measures

of the limits of state regulation over individual activity.
On the basis of past decisions it appears that the federal
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courts would uphold a reasonable, non-discriminatory
limited entry scheme.

Economic and conservation regula-

tions in the public interest are valid areas of state
concern.

To help assure that an act is upheld, any

limited entry scheme should be supported by firm biological
and economic data proving that such regulation is necessary
and in the public interest.

Careful drafting of the

scheme to assur«~ that similarly situated individuals are
treated alike will also help sustain the program from
constitutional attack.
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STATE LAW AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Introduction
Management alternatives under FCMA range from
federal regulation within the FCZ with individual state
or interstate regulation of territorial seas to federal
regulation of ·the FCZ and territorial seas by preemption.
Under FCMA federal preemption of state authority may be
triggered by state action or inaction causing management
conflict.

Although the great majority of the surf clam

resource is harvested within the FCZ and subject to
federal regulation under FCMA, state laws affecting
resource management, may prove important in developing
an effective and comprehensive management scheme.
In this section, the laws of New York, New
Jersey, Delawa1~e, Maryland and Virginia, states with
significant participation in the surf clam fishery, are
analyzed, as are the laws of the two bordering states of
Connecticut and North Carolina.

Constitutional, statutory,

or regulatory language is often subject to differing interpretations.

As a practical matter, the limiting factor in

many cases may be interpretation and implementation at the
management level.

For these· reasons it is important for

state management authorities and their legal advisors to
review their own statutes, regulations, and administrative
customs in ordE~r to determine what scope of management
authority exist within the statutory framework and also
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to identify possible areas of conflict with federal regulation
under FCMA.
The categories considered are as follows:
Constitution.

The state constitution provisions

on due process and equal protection are considered.

In most

cases the state courts, which are the final authority in
construing the state constitution, use standards similar to
those used by the federal courts interpreting the federal
constitution.

In addition, some states have other constitutional

provisions relevant to limited entry, and
are considered.

these provisions

The purpose of this subsection is to explain

the constitutional limits of limited entry legislation in
the various states.
Prote:ction of Marine Resources.

In some states,

the state court has specifically addressed the problem of
protecting marine resources, and the attitude of the state
towards such conservation is analyzed in this subsection.
As a general rule, a state owns the marine resources within
its waters, but that ownership is deemed to be for the public
benefit.

The state ownership is for the purpose of regula-

tion, but that regulation is subject to any recognized
constitutional restraints.

Thus, to say that a state owns

its marine resources does not avoid the limitations on
regulation derived from constitutional rights.
Present Fishery/Shellfish Management Structure.
The existing fishery or shellfish management statutes in
each state are presented in this subsection.

This section
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identifies the entity having authority over shellfish
management and the extent of that authority.
Criteria for Management.

In this subsection,

statements of management policy and statutory standards
for management .are presented.
Ability to Enter Interstate Compacts. Certain
states grant their management agency the authority to
enter into management agreements with other states.
This subsection considers that grant of power.
Existing Surf Clam Regulations. Certain states
have current regulations or statutes in effect which
regulate the surf clam fishery.

These are itemized.

It

is important to know what regulations exist, and whether
they derive from a statute (in which case an act of the
legislature would be necessary to alter them) or from a
regulation of the management agency (in which case the
procedures for changing regulations would have to be
followed).
Summa!.Y.

In this subsection the impediments to

limited entry in each state are itemized.

The constitutional

dangers and the scope of existing management structures and
criteria are analyzed as is the necessity for amending
existing surf clam regulations.
Connecticut
Constitution.

'
Connecticut
follows the federal

standards in applying the equal protection and due process
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clauses of the state constitution.

1

Persons may be classi-

fied as long as the classifications are fair and are
. 1 ation.
.
2
reasona bl y re 1ate d. to t h e purpose o f t h e 1 egis
The Connecticut courts recognize the right of the
state to regulate property and pursuits of trade, with the
limitation that all persons in the same situation be treated
similarly. 3 Regulation of business must not be unreasonably
in excess of what is necessary to accomplish the legislative
end.4

In addition, "right to work" language in Connecticut

common law resulted in a court holding that the principle of
equality of rights must be observed in regulating a business
in which all citizens have an equal right to participate. 5
It may be argued that a fishery is a business in which everyone has a right to work.

In order to exclude participants by

means of a limited entry scheme, the need for limiting access
may undergo strict judicial scrutiny.

Connecticut has a

tradition of acknowledging the right to work in businesses
not "clothed with the public interest."

Usually regulated

businesses are those with great potential for damage to the
public by way of fraud or health hazard.

In order to qualify

as an industry requiring regulation (and therefore requiring
limited entry), it would be necessary to prove the damage
to the general welfare in having an unregulated fishery.

In

states where business regulation is readily accepted, there
would be a lesser burden of proof than in Connecticut, which
traditionally has supported the freedom to work without
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restriction.

'

This does automatically bar limited entry in

Connecticut, but rather requires careful planning and
drafting of a program to qualify in that state.
Protection of Marine Resources. Connecticut does
not have a body of case law recognizing the power of the
state to protect its fishery resources.

Connecticut has

relied on tight statutory language in resource protection,
and the courts have generally recognized only the statutory
powers to protect these resources.

Therefore, it will be

difficult to imply the power to initiate a limited entry
plan within the present legal framework of the state.
Present Fishery/Shell Fishery Management Structure.
The Commissioner of Environmental Protection administers
6
all fish and wildlife laws in Connecticut.
The authorization is not to manage or protect the resources, but rather
to carry out certain enumerated administrative duties.
Licenses are required of all persons over 16 who
7
want to fish.
Vessels are also licensed. 8 Shell fish
grounds are taxed, 9 and speculation in shellfish grounds
. .
10
is prohibited.
Any license holder may be required to
report to the Commissioner data concerning vessel size,
11
gear, catch or any other information requested.
Criteria for Management. Since the Department of
Environmental Protection has little discretion in managing
shell fisheries, there is no statutory statement of criteria
to be used.

The broad language authorizing protection and
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conservation familiar to other state statutes is absent
from Connecticut statutory law.

Where discretion in

management is allowed by statute, it is only a specific
grant for a specific fishery.

For example, Connecticut

allows regulation of anadromous trout, salmon and charr, but
specifies by statute what goals and means are to be
12
observed in management.
Thus criteria for management
are not readily ascertainable.
Ability to Enter Interstate Compacts.

The

Commissioner of Environmental Protection is authorized to
cooperate with agencies of the Federal Government and of
other state governments. 13 Connecticut is a member of the
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact and has ratified
amendment I of this compact.
Existing Surf Clam Regulations.

Connecticut

prohibits taking of clams by non-residents, 14 and as
stated above, requires residents to obtain a license.
Summa:EY..

Connecticut's constitutional law

would accept limited entry, although the common law
tradition of right to work will require firm proof that
regulation is needed.

The statutory management scheme

is very tight, leaving little room for any implied powers.
Connecticut would require legislation to implement limited
entry.

Since E!Xisting legislation allows a daily catch

. . to b e set f or oysters, 15 1 1m1te
· . d entry s h ould not be
1 imit

foreign or replusive to the Legislature.

It would, however,
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be outside the statutory authority of present management
agencies to initiate such a scheme.
Delaware
Constitution.

The Delaware Court uses the

formula and int,erpretation employed by the United States
Supreme Court when examining the validity of economic
regulation under the state due process and equal protection
clause.16
For due process, the Court looks first to see
if the objective of the statute or regulation is a legitimate one.

For example, is conservation of the fishery

resource or economic management of the fishery a legitimate purpose?

Second, is there a rational relationship

between the means used to achieve the objective and
the objective itself?

For example, is limiting the number

of fishermen a rational method to achieve the objective of
conservation or economic efficiency?

The Delaware Court

would answer both of these questions in the affirmative.

17

For equal protection, the Court will examine the
classification to determine whether it bears some relation
to the purpose for which the classification was made. 18
A statute carries a presumption of constitutionality, and
the Legislature has a wide discretion in matters of classification.

The legislative judgement will not be disturbed
19
unless the act (classification) is clearly arbitrary.
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There are no other constitutional provisions
which might relate to limited entry.
Protection of Marine Resources. No significant
body of· case law was discovered on this subject.
Present Fishery/Shellfish Management Structure.
Shellfish in Delaware are managed by the Delaware
Commission of Shell Fisheries.

This is a five member

Commission, appointed by the Governor, with at least two
members who are engaged in the shellfish industry. 20 The
Commission may issue permits to persons engaged in the
shellfish industry and may set fees not to exceed $.05
21
per bushel.
The basic authority of the Commission is as
follows:
"The Commission shall have full control and
direction of the shellfish industry and the
protection of shellfish throughout this state."
Regulations of the Commission carry the force of law. 22
Criteria for Management.

The Commission is to

regulate for the following purposes:
"(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

To p~eserve and improve the shellfish
industry in this State.
To operate, cultivate, and replenish on
the oyster or clam grounds or beds in
waters within the jurisdiction of this
State.
·
To regulate, inspect and approve any boat
or vessel or equipment used in the shellfish industry in this State.
To provide regulations for th~ replacement
of any boat or vessel lost'or destroyed
which was licensed in the shellfish industry
of this State.
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(5)

When deemed necessary to provide for the
issuance of permits to persons engaged in
the shellfish industry in this State and
for the revocation for cause of such
permits.
To provide for the preservation and improvement of the oysz3r and clam beds and grounds
of this State."

(6)

Ability to Enter Interstate Compacts.

The Dela-

ware Commission of Shell Fisheries has no authority to enter
interstate agreements.

An act of the Delaware Legislature is

required to bind the state to an interstate compact.

Dela-

ware is a member of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
Compact, but has not consented to amendment I of this
compact. 2 4
In a compact with New Jersey on fishing in the
Delaware River and Bay, each state expressly reserved
jurisdiction over shell fishing.

The pertinent portion

reads as follows:
111

Nothing contained in this chapter shall affect
the territorial limits, rights or jurisdiction of
the States of Delaware or New Jersey of, in, or
over the Delaware River, or in the ownership of
the s:ubaqueous soil thereof, except as is expressly
set forth in the compact between the two States;
nor shall anything contained in this chapter affect
in any way the planting, catching or taking of
oysters, clams or other shellfish or interfere
with the oyster industry, as zarried on under the
laws of either of the States. )
Although this is not a general reservation of
power, it is possible that Delaware would not be willing
to agree by compact to give up any of its power over shell
fisheries.
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Existing Surf Clam Regulations.

The present license

requirements derive from the statute, as follows:
A permit is required from the Commission, and a
tax of $.05 per bushel may be levied. 26
Other regulations derive from the Commission, as
follows:
From .June through September surf clams can be
taken no closer than two miles from any part of the shoreline.

From October through May, surf clams can be taken

only within two miles of any portions of the shoreline
of the State. 27
Summa1~. The Delaware Constitution should not bar
a limited entry scheme.

The Commission of Shell Fisheries

has a broad mandate to regulate the industry, including
licensing vessels and issuing permits to persons engaged in
the industry.

This authority contains no restriction as

to what factors may be considered in setting management
policy.

Maryland
Constitution.

The Maryland Supreme Court follows

the standards for decision of the United States Supreme
Court in construing the due process and equal protection
.

.

cause
o f testate
h
const1tut1on.
1

28

For example, the 1971 Maryland wetlands statute
prohibiting dredging of any tidal waters or marshlands
29
withstood attack on due process grounds.
The
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preservation of natural resources was held to be a valid
exercise of the police power.

This case indicates that the

Maryland court would be very inclined to accept the legislative determination that limited entry was necessary for
conservation of a fishery resource.

30

One other Maryland constitutional provision that
must be dealt with is the prohibition of monopolies.

The

article states that:
monopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit
of a free government and the princip1rs of
commerce, and ought not be suffered.
The Maryland court has said that a momopoly must
be more than a mere privilege to carry on a trade or business; it must be an exclusive privilege which prevents all
others from participating.

A limited entry plan is not

confined to one 1entity as the monopoly clause envisions, but
involves a number of units participating in the fishery.
In addition, if the grant of privileges is necessary for
the protection of some public interest (justified under

the police power) it will not fall within the ban on
monopolies. 32

Thus a limited entry scheme should be

able to avoid this provision.
The anti-monopoly provision must be kept in mind
when planning the future operations of the limited entry
scheme.

For example, if licenses or stock certificates are

used, the subsequent transferability of the instruments and
rights must be controlled to prevent creation of a monopoly
situation.
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Protection of Marine Resources.

Maryland

recognizes protection of natural resources as a valid exercise of the state police power (see above, Maryland wetlands statute).

Even when fish are taken and reduced to

possession by an individual, ownership of a fish species
may be regulated and restrained by appropriate legislation
33
for the benefit of the public.
In addition, Maryland
allows its Department of Natural Resources to maintain
its own list of endangered species, and the catching,
processing or selling of any such listed species is
totally prohibited. 34 In Corsa v. Tawes 3 5 the District
Court for Maryland held that in the practical management
of its resources such as fish and game, the state may
conclude that the time for action is long before the
destruction has gone so far that the extinction of the
species is imminent, and the protective hand of the state
may be extended before the danger is unmistakably imminent.
Thus, anticipatory planning and management are accepted

concepts in Maryland law.
Present Fishery/Shellfish Management Structure.
The Department of Natural Resources is responsible for all
natural resource policies and plans in the state.36

The

Fisheries Administration of the Department is charged with
the conservation management of fish within the state.37
The Fisheries Administration can promulgate regulations
relating to all living natural resources of the tidal
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waters. 38

These regulations may include, but are not limited

to, provisions enlarging, extending, restricting or pro;_
hibiting the taking or catching of these resources. 39
Licenses are required for taking clams and oysters, with a
residency requirement of one year and set statutory fees
based on type of gear used. 40
Criteria for Management. The authority for management is found in the enumeration of responsibilities and
duties of the Secretary of Natural Resources, as follows:
The Secretary is responsible for the development
of coordinated policies for the preservation,
conservation, wise use, and perpetuation of the
natural resources of the state.41
Under this broad grant of authority, the Secretary may
regulate by considering any legitimate, relevant factors.
Ability to Enter Interstate Compacts. The
Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources has the
42
.
. 1 ation.
.
h Department h as
aut h ority
to recommen d 1 egis
Te
the power to negotiate interstate agreements, as follows:
The Department may negotiate any agreement with
any other state concerning catching fish, the
size of fish, and opening and closing fishing
seasons. ::S
Maryland is a member of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
Compact and not a party to amendment I of that compact.4 4
Existing Surf Clam Regulations.

Regulations

relating to surf clams are limited to license, fee, and
residence requirements.4 5
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Summa!:_y. Under due process and equal protection,
Maryland courts should uphold a limited entry scheme, but
care must be taken to avoid the anti-monopoly term of the
Constitution.

The broad authority given to the Department

of Natural Resources should include the ability to impose
a limited entry scheme.
New Jersey
Constitution.

Tu satisfy due process, 46 the

New Jersey Court must be convinced that the interests of
the community as a whole are being served by the regulation,
and that the means selected bear a substantial relationship
to the object of the statute.

In upholding an economic

regulation, the court stated:
"(U)nder the police power the legislature may
make provisions for the economic welfare of the
people ... When conditions in a business become
such that the welfare of the public will not be
adequately protected by unrestricted competition,
or if it be shown that ruinous and chaotic
conditions are otherwise about to be brought about

by the business, or that the economic existence
of large numbers of people is being threatened,
then the law may step in and prescribe regulations
to correct the alleged or threatened abuse. 11 47
Limited entry legislation could probably sustain a due
process challenge in New Jersey.
New Jersey follows the United States Supreme Court
48 were
.
.
.
h
·
·
on equa 1 protec t 1.on
1.nterpretat1.on,
t h e c 1 assi. f 1.cat1.on
is not based upon suspect criteria, such as race or wealth,
and the violation of a fundamental right is not involved.
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If the limited entry scheme would not trigger strict
scrutiny under equal protection, New Jersey would follow
the federal "rational relationship" test.
Under this equal protection test, wide discretion
is given to the Legislature in classifying, so that any
limited entry seheme that is not blatantly discriminatory
49
will meet New Jiersey standards.
Protection of Marine Resources. The power to
50
regulate fisheries is recogni.zed,
and regulations for
the preservation of shell fisheries have been held valid
and constitutional. 51
Present Fishery/Shellfish Management Structure.
The Department of Environmental Protection, through the
Division of Fish, Game, and Shell Fisheries, manages fishery
resources. 52 Shellfish are managed by a nine member Shell
Fisheries Council, appointed by the Governo11.53
Criteria for Management.

The authority granted

is as follows:

The! Shell Fisheries Council shall, subject
to the! approval of the Commissioner, formulate
compre!hensive policies for the preservation and
improv ~ent of the shellfish industry of the
state. 5
There are no other enumerated.limitations on the power or
standards for management.
Ability to Enter Interstate Compacts.
'

The

Division of Natural Reso~rces of the Department of Environmental Protection has the following power:
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"(d) Cooperate with other State agencies and
departments and with interstate and Federal departments and agencies, and with interested
individuals and groups in the promotion and
development of plans, policies, and programs
for the study, beneficial use, conservation
and protectign of natural resources within
the State. 11 .':>.':>
In addition, New Jersey maintains an Intergovernmental Relations Commission, whose function is
defined as:
"to carry forward the participation of this State
as a member of the Council of State Governments,
both regionally and nationally, to confer with
officials of other states and of Federal Governments, to formulate proposals for cooperation
between this State and the other States, and
with the Federal Government, to maintain liaison
with the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations established by Federal law, and to
organize and maintain governmental machinery for
such purposes. 11 56
It appears that interstate agreements are the province of
both organizations, with the Division of Natural Resources
having special authority over natural resources alone.
New Jersey is a member of the Atlantic States
Marit-e Fisheries Compact and a party to amendment I of
this compact. 57
Existing Surf Clam Regulations. New Jersey law
sets forth a system encompassing a limited number of
licenses, overall weekly quotas, area and season closures,
gear restrictions, data requirements and fees based on
resource harvest.58
Summa!Y. The New Jersey constitutional requirements
should be easily met by a limited entry scheme.

The mandate
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to the New Jersey management entity is broad enough to
include promulgation of regulations for limited entry.
The present shellfish regulations are statutory, so any
limited entry program would have to either (1) meet the
same standards as the existing statutes or (2) include
legislative action to amend or repeal the shellfish laws.
New York
Constitution. To satisfy due process59 in New
York, legislation must promote the health, safety or welfare of the public in general, rather than give a special
benefit to a particular class, and the means used must be
reasonably related to the accomplishment of the "public"
objective. 60 A particular class of people may be incidentally
benefited by legislation, as long as the legislation also
benefits the public as a whole.

If it does promote the

public welfare, it will meet due process requirements, even
if it inflicts a hardship on certain people. 61
Under New York equal protection 62 standards it is
necessary to prove that the classification has a relation
to a public purpose.

The Legislature has broad discretionary

powers of classification, and a classification will be struck
down only if it is clearly arbitrary. 63 A reasonable classification of fishermen or vessels under a limited entry
scheme would not be arbitrary and would bear a rational
relation to the objective of the statute and therefore
would withstand equal protection attack.
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Protection of Marine Resources.

Conservation and

regulation of fish and animals have been held to be the
responsibility of the state, as a matter of public interest.64
The New.York Court, in Grossman v. Hotel Astor, 65 accorded
great deference: to the legislative judgement in regulating
natural resources, and acknowledged great discretion in the
legislature in the formulation of conservation plans. 6 6
New York treats natural marine resources as the
property of the state, held in its sovereign capacity for the
benefit of all people, and the court recognizes great power
in the state to regulate fisheries. 67
Under the Environmental Conservation, Fish and
Wildlife Act, the state owns all fish, wildlife and shell.fish, so that even upon possession, title remains in "the
state for the purpose of regulating and controlling their
.
. .
1168
use an d d 1.spos1t1on.
·

Present Fishery/Shellfish Management Structure.
Fishery management duties belong to the Department of
Environmental Conservation, whose powers and duties include:
promotion and coordination of water, land and air resources,
and providing for the protection and management of marine
and coastal resources.69
In addition, the Department has the power:
"To issue licenses and permits provided for by
law, to fix their terms, and the fees therefor,
when no statutory provision is made, and
revoke
licenses and permits as provided by law."

?8
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"To regulate the taking of fish in any manner
other than angling, except as to migrat~IY fish
of the sea within the marine district."
"To control, manage, propagate and distribute,
and to regulate the transportation, importation
and exporation of shellfish and crustacea."72
"To regulate the examination and inspection of
shellfish grounds, boats used in taking and
buildings used for storage of shellfish, the
handling and shipment of shellfish, the floating
of shellfish, the removal of shellfish from
unsanitary beds and their deposit on unpolluted
grounds. 11 73
"To enforce all laws relating to lands under
water which have been or shall be designated,
surveyed and mapped out pursuant to law as oyster
beds or shellfish grounds and to grant leases of
such lands, belonging to th state, for shellfish
culture, according to law."
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Criteria for Management.

The purpose of the New

York Fish and Wildlife Law is to effect the "efficient
management of the fish and wildlife resources of the
state. 11 75

The statutory guidelines for management are

as follows:
"To such extent as it shall deem feasible
without prejudice to other functions in the management of fish and wildlife resources of the state
and the execution of other duties imposed by law,
the department is directed, in the exercise of
the powers conferred upon it, to develop and carry
out programs and procedures which will in its
judgmEmt, (a) promote natural propagation and
maintEmance of desirable species in ecological
balance, and (b) lead to the observance of sound
management practices for such propagation and
maintenance on lands and waters of the state,
whether owned by the private ownership, having
regard to (1) ecological factors, habitat and
the importance of ecological balance in maintaining
natural resources; (2) the compatibility of
production and desirable land uses; (3) the
importance of fish and wildlife premises and of the
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persons and property of occupants thereof against
abus: of p~iv~leges of ac~ess g such premises for
hunting, fishing or trapping."

7

Ability to Enter Interstate Compacts.

The

Department of Environmental Conservation has the following
power:
(To effect efficient management it) "shall include,
to the extent authorized by law, the undertaking and
execution of reciprocal and cooperative arrangements
with the government of the United States, with other
states, and with other departments and agencies of
this state, political subdivisions and public
corporations of this state and owners and lessees
of privately owned lands and waters and shall also
include continuation of research and educational
programs. 11 77
Thus, the power to enter interstate agreements is granted.
New York, although a member of the Atlantic States Marine·.
Fisheries Compact, is not a party to amendment I of that
compact.
Existing Surf Clam Regulations.

New York requires

that persons engaged in shellfishing carry a digger's permit;
there is a six month residency requirement for a digger's
. 77a
permit.
Shippers and processors must have a permit, and
there is a one year residency requirement to market shellfish.

No clams less than 3 inches in longest diameter may

be exported from the state.

The penalty for violation of

the regulation is loss of permit.77b
Summa!.Y_.

The New York constitutional standards

should not bar limited entry.

The state ranks preservation
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of natural

resources very highly.

The statutory grant of

power would appear to give the Department of Environmental
Conservation the authority to limit entry and consider
economic factors in regulating a fishery.
North Carolina
Constitution.

The North Carolina equal protection

and due process clauses 78 have been interpreted according
to the standard federal tests.79

Legislation satisfies

due process requirements if it is not unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious and the means selected have a substantial
relation to the objects sought to be attained.so

Statutory

classifications must be reasonable and must be related to
the public health.81
North Carolina has a strong "right to work"
82 Wh
· ·
·
.
.
tra d 1.t1.on
un der 1.ts
constitution.
en th estate sough t
to license dry cleaners, the statute was struck down with
strong language:
The right of a citizen to pursue any of the
ordinary vocations, on his own property and with
his own means, can neither be denied nor unduly
abridged by the Legislature for the preservation
of such right is the principle purpose of the
Constitution itself. In such cases, the limit
of legislative power is regulation, unless the
business is of such character as places it w!thin the category of social and economic ills. 3
The court felt that there was no public interest to be
protected in the regulation of dry cleaning that would
justify invading the right of a citizen to choose his
occupation.
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Limited entry would have to be clearly justified
to satisfy a North Carolina court.

Because of the common

law pattern of protecting the right to work, the public
benefit to be derived by limiting entry must be clear and
convincing to persuade the court that the legislature may
invade this private right.
Recently the North Carolina court reiterated its
position on the: right to work.

A North Carolina statute

had permitted a. licensing commission to deny permits to
build hospitals if the commission felt there was no need
for an additional hospital in the area.

The court held

this to be unconstitutional under equal protection and due
process. 8 4 Regulation of totally private enterprise· on
the basis of economic need for that enterprise in the
community was held to be beyond the police power of the
state.
Any exercise by the State of its police power is,
of course, a deprivation of liberty. Whether it
is a violation of the (due process) clause or a
va~id exercise of the police power is a question
of degree and of reasonableness in relation to
the public good likely to result from it. To
deny a person, association, or corporation the
right to engage in a business, otherwise lawful,
is a far greater restriction upon his or its
liberty than to deny the right to charge in that
business whatever price~ the owner sees fit to
charge for the service. 5
.
Limited entry may be justified on economic as well as other
criteria.

North Carolina, however, has shown reluctance

to allow infringement on the right to work solely on· the
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basis of economic criteria.

Limited entry can be distinguished,

however, since the fishery resources are subject to public
regulation, whereas in In Re Certificate of Need for Aston
Park Hospital the state was attempting to regulate a totally
private industry.

The court was in essence saying, if

private industry wants to take the risk, the state can't
interfere.

With fishery resources, however, the state has

an interest as custodian of the resource.
Additional constitutional considerations revolve
around the anti-·monopoly clauses. 86 Exclusive franchises
are unconstitutional,87 but legitimate classifications that
can withstand equal protection tests will not fall under the
monopoly or exclusive privilege clauses.

A grandfather

clause, entitling a person to a present right only if he had
participated in the industry at some time in the past, is also
unconstitutiona1. 88 The North Carolina constitution would
probably bar a limited entry program in which rights could
be inherited.
Pre_servation of Marine Resources.

North Carolina

has a strong common law tradition of recognizing the power
of the state to protect its fishery resources.89

Conserva-

tion is viewed in terms of state ownership of the fishing
resources, with all rights of access and harvest left to
the discretion of the state. 90
By statute as well as common law, the power
of the state to protect its resources is acknowledged.
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The marine and estuarine and wildlife resources
of the State belong to the people of the State
as a whole . . The Department and the Commission
are c:harged with stewardship of these resources. 9 1
Prese~nt Fishery/Shellfish Management Structure.
The Department of Natural and Economic Resources is charged
with the duty of promoting the conservation and development
of the natural resources of the state. 92 The Marine Fisheries
Commission of the Department is empowered "to make regulations
and take all steps necessary to develop and improve the
cultivation, harvesting and marketing of oysters and clams
in North Carolina both from public grounds and private beds. 1193
All vessels must be licensed, 94 with maximum license fees
set by statute, 95 and clammers must also have licenses. 96
Clams are taxed at 6 cents per bushel. 97 License holders
can be required to keep certain records on demand of the
Department. 98
Crite!ria tor Management. The Department of Natural
and Economic Resources is authorized to promote "conservation
and development of natural resources" and "development of

commerce and industry. 1199

In addition, there is a state

policy to promote coastal fisheries and the seafood industry.100
There is also the stewardship provision mentioned above.
In addition to the.broad general powers written
into the statute, the Marine Fisheries Commission is
authorized to authorize, license, regulate, prohibit:, prescribe, or restrict all forms of marine
and estuarine resources in coastal fishing waters
with respect to:
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(1) Time, place, character or dimensions of
any methods or equipment that may be employed
in taking fish;
(2) Seasons for taking fish;
(3) Size limits on and maximum quantities of
fish that may be taken, possessed, bailed to
anothE~r, transported, sold or given away.
(b) The Marine Fisheries Commission is
authorized to authorize, regulate, prohibit,
prescribe, or restrict and the Department is
authorized to license:
(1) The opening and closing of coastal fishing
waters, except as to inland game fish, whether
entirE~ly or only as to the taking of particular
classE~s or fish, use of particular equipment, or
as to other activities within the jurisdiction
of thE~ Department; and
(2) The possession, cultivation, transportation,
importation, exportation, sale, purchase, acquisition,
and disposition of all marine and estuarine resources
and all related equipment, implements, vessels, and
conveyances as necessary to implement the t5£rk of
the Department in carrying out is duties. 1
Ability to Enter Interstate Compacts.

The Depart-

ment of Natural and Economic Resources is authorized to
cooperate with agencies of the Federal Government and of
102
other states.
North Carolina is a party to the Atlantic
State Marine Fisheries Compact and Amendment I of that
compact.
Existing Surf Clam Regulations.

There is

licensing of vessels and clammers, and a tax per bushel,
as mentioned above.
Summat:y.

The common law supporting the right

to work will have to be carefully considered in drafting
limited entry legislation for North Carolina.

Before

fishermen can be! excluded, the need for limited entry will
have to be clearly demonstrated and the allocation scheme
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will have to be carefully developed.

However, some precedent

exists for economic management of fisheries in North Carolina.
Shrimp seasons, for example, are opened and closed on the
basis of the commercial size of the shrimp, a factor unrelated to biological conservation. 103 The state might be
willing to accept economic criteria for fishery management.
In contrast with the state constitutional law,
the management statutes are quite broad and imply a great
deal of power vested in the management agencies.

The

agency can liceinse vessels and clammers, and tax clams to
the statutory limit.
Virginia
Constitution.

The Virginia Court applies the same
test and interpretation to the State due process clause 104
as the United States Supreme Court applies to the federal
due process provision:

does the statute promote public

welfare and does it employ reasonable means to accomplish
that end~os
The E!qual protection provision is as follows:
The General Assembly shall not enact any
local, special, or private law in the following
cases:
(12) Regulating labor, trade, mining, or
manufacturing, or the rate of interest on money.
(18) Granting to any private corporation,
a~sociati'?n? or indiv~dual.any 15gecial or exclusive
right, privilege, or immunity.
The construction of this provision turns on the phrase
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"special laws," and the fact that a law benefits only
some of the people does not of itself make it a special
law; the classification of persons in the statute must be
reasonably related to the purpose of the act, meaning
that the clause is interpreted in the same way as the
equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution.107
The Legislature is given wide discretion in classifying,
and legislative judgment will be overturned only when
it is clearly arbitrary.
The other relevant portion of the Virginia
Constitution is Article XI, which makes conservation of
natural resources a state constitutional policy,108 and
directs the state to cooperate with other states, the
Federal Government,

units of the Virginia government,

and persons interested in the conservation of natural
resources. 109
Protection of Marine Resources.

Virginia treats

fisheries as the common property of its citizens - a

property over which the State is entitled to legislate. 110
The Constitutional provision for protection of natural
resources discussed above also reflects the State
attitude toward protection of resources.
Present Fishery/Shellfish Management Structure.
The Marine Resources Commission manages fisheries in
Virginia.

It i.s a seven member Commission, with members

representing a variety of users of marine resources in the
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state.
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The Commission can enact regulations.

Violation

of regulations is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of
not more than $1,000 or imprisonment of not more than 12
months, or both.112
In 1973 this additional power was granted to
the Commission:
The Commission is authorized and empowered to
promulgate such regulations as it deems necessary
and appropriate to promote the consrr~ation and
wise use of the surf-clam resource.
Criteria for Management.

The Commission's power

to make regulations is modified by the standard:
"to promote the general welfare of the seafood
industry and to conserve and promote the seafood
and marine resources of the State, including
regulations as to the taking of seafood, which
regulations do no ~onflict with the provisions
of statutory law. 11
Ability to Enter Interstate Compacts.

The

Marine Resources Commission has not specifically been
granted the power to negotiate interstate agreements on
marine resources.

Virginia is, however, a party to the

Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact and Amendment I
of that compact.
Current Surf Clam Regulations.

There are at

the present no surf clam regulations in Virginia.

However,

any purchaser of shellfish must obtain a $25.00 license for
each place of business, and a $15.00 license for each boat
or motor vehicle used.115
Summa:!.Y.. The due process and equal protection
standards of Virginia can be met, as long as the "Special

113

laws" standard is observed.

The state has a constitutional

policy of resource conservation.

The management authority

is broad, and surf clam management is specifically authorized,
so a limited entry scheme for surf clams should be acceptable.
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ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT SCHEMES
Introduction
In this section several alternative systems of
limiting entry are presented.

For each alternative (a)

the legal problems associated with the proposal will be
itemized; (b) the ability of each of the states to enact
the proposal will be summarized and (c) the status of
the proposal under FCMA will be examined.
I.

QUOTAS
(A)

This alternative involves setting a maximum

limit on the total harvest, and usually refers to an annual
quota.

The legal problems are twofold; first, do existing

management statutes authorize agencies to set quotas, and
second, how shall this allotted catch be divided among the
participants in a fishery?

Since setting a maximum

permissible catch is a crucial part of any limited entry
program, this is a key threshhold issue.

Quotas as an

alternative in themselves usually represent a simple system
of deciding how much of a stock can be harvested, ignoring
allocation, and declaring the fishery closed when the
maximum has been taken.

This is economically inefficient

and subject to a due process attack.
(B)

Each of the states has the following powers

with respect to setting an annual quota:
Connecticut - no implied power
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Delaware - implied, under Del. Code Ann. Tit. 7,
sec. 1904
Maryland - implied, under Md. N. R. 4-202,1-104
New Jersey - implied, under N.J.S.A.

13:lB-45

New York - implied, under N.Y.E.C.L. sec. 11-0305
North Carolina - express, under N.C.G.S. 113-182.
Virginia - implied, under Code of Va. 28.1-23
(C)

FCMA

Section 303 (b) (3) allows a Regional

Management Council the discretion of instituting quotas. 1

II.

AREA CLOSURES
(A)

A program may seek to limit entry hr closing

certain areas to fishing.

To do this, a state must have

the authority to close areas and the power to declare such
closures on the basis of economic as well as biological
criteria.
(B)

The present management structures offer the

following powers with respect to area closures:
Connecticut - no implied power
Delaware - implied under preservation of clam
beds, Del. Code Ann. Titl. 7, sec. 1904
Maryland - implied, under "preservation," Md.
N. R. Sec. 1-104
New Jersey - implied, N.J.S.A. 13:lB-45
New York - implied from power to regulate the
taking N.Y.E.C.L. sec. 11-0305(3) and power
to preserve the grounds, N.Y.E.C.L. sec.
11-0305(7)
North Carolina - implied from power to restrict
place of taking fish N.C.G.S. 113-182.
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Virginia - implied under regulation of taking of
seafood, Code of Virginia 28.1-23.
III.

SHORT TERM CATCH LIMITS
(A)

This program involves having the management

agency set a daily, weekly or monthly limit on how much can
be harvested.

The authority to set limits on catch is express

for some species in some states (e.g., oysters in Connecticut),
but it might also be implied from the power to manage the
resource.
(B)

Only New Jersey has specific authorization

to set short term catch limits for surf clams. 2

In other

states it i.s implied from the same provisions as is the
power to impose a quota.

(I, (B)).

Where the power to

manage has been used to impose catch limits on other species
(e.g., Connecticut oyster catch limits) there should be no
statutory bar to imposition of a catch limit on surf clams.
(C)

Under FCMA short term catch limits appear

to be possible under Section 303 (b) (3) .3
IV.

LICENSES OR PERMITS
(A)

This program limits entry by licensing

only a limited number of participating units.

The

licenses might run to vessels, fishermen or gear, depending
on which unit was best suited to serve as an avenue for
control of exploitation of the stocks.

Limited entry

licensing differs from present licensing patterns since
there would only be a certain number of licenses available,
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and the management entity would have to decide who would
receive them.

The legal problems, therefore, do not stop

at the power to issue licenses, which all the states have.
The criteria for issuing the licenses are most important.
Where the access will be restricted and some
participants may be excluded, the constitutionality of the
limited entry program will turn on how the licenses are
allocated among applicants.

In the Alaska limited entry

program, allocation priorities are set by considering the
degree of economic dependence on the fishery, the extent
of past participation in the fishery, and the present
ability and intent to participate in the fishery.
16.43.200).

(A.S. sec.

Such a system should satisfy due process and

equal protection.

Although lotteries or auctions of

licenses are fa.ir, they are also arbitrary and bear no
relation to the: purpose of the statute and would probably
not be satisfactory allocation methods for equal protection.
In addition, if a limited number of licenses is
issued the license itself will have a value, representing
the value of the right to fish.

The program should clearly

address the issue of this value.

The program must specify

two things.

The first is whether and how the license can

be transferred.

The license should not be available to

non-participants in the fishery since this would lead to
speculation in obtaining licenses.

It is also not related

to the legislative purpose of the program.

Additionally,
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there should be limits on how many licenses any single
person or business could hold, to protect against monopoly
(several states have anti-monopoly provisions).

Licenses

should be transferred, if at all, only through the management
agency, with specific standards and controls clearly outlined as to the number of licenses any one participant
could hold.

The second point which the program must specify

is whether the license can be attached by creditors of the
holder.

Most states exempt the tools of a debtor's trade

from attachment.

This is in keeping with a policy of

limited alienability and with a legislative purpose of
protecting the fishing industry and the fishermen.
(B)

All the states authorize the issuance of

licenses for vessels.

Only New Jersey has express authori-

zation to limit the number of licenses,4 although this
could be implied in other states from the power to manage
/as in I

(Bl7.

However, limiting the number of licenses

creates a property value, the nature of which is unclear,

and it may, therefore, be unwise to attempt to initiate a
limited entry licensing program by administrative regulation
alone.

It would be beyond the administrative power to

define the property attributes of these new licenses.

Such

a program would require legislative action.
(C)

FCMA allows the use of permits or licenses

under Section 303 b (1) and limited entry under Section 303 b
(6).5
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V.

STOCK CERTIFICATES OR FISHERMEN QUOTAS
(A)

The stock certificate program, rather than

licensing vessels or persons, divides the available harvest
into shares and distributes the shares to the fishermen.
Each fisherman gets his own quota, or stock certificate,
representing the percentage of the harvest to which he
is entitled.

The management agency must have authority

to set an overall quota, and devise an equitable system for
allocating the shares among competing participants.
The problem in allocating quotas is similar to that
in the licensing scheme.

Equal protection must be satisfied

in creating standards for deciding what allocations will be
permitted to which participants.

A system based on

participation in or dependence upon the fishery to determine
the class of eligible entrants would be appropriate.

Shares

would have to be divided on the basis of size of vessel, or
possibly average catch over a certain number of years in the
past.

The allocation method must not only be reasonable

and treat all applicants fairly and equitably, but it must
also be related to the preservation of the fishery and the
industry, which rules out the auction and lottery.
Transfer characteristics and status of the
certificate with respect to debt must be assigned.

This

is a new form of property being created by the program,
and the traits of the property must be defined.
(B)

Because this is a departure from traditional

management practices, it is not within the scope of
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existing management authority.

It would require legislation

in all the states.
The legal aspects of the instrument deal with
policy choices, not with straightforward legalities or
illegalities.

It is within the legislative power of each

of the states and the Federal Government to enact a stock
certificate plan.

The plan is similar to leasing resource

access rights to mineral resources but because it is unusual
to fisheries the power tc, implement such a plan would not
be implied in the management authority of any of the states.
Additionally, because of the complexity of jurisdiction,
legislation concordant with other states and the Federal
Government would be necessary.
(C)

Although FCMA does not specifically mention

this concept, Section 303 b (6) could appear to be worded
broadly enough to incorporate such a concept.6
VI.

TAXES OR USER FEES
(A)

This program limits entry by charging a fee

to use the resource which i.s high enough to discourage
economically

inefficient fishermen.

While present

management often involves paying a fee for license or a
tax on catch, all of these fees have statutory limits set
at a very low level.

The user fee limited entry program

would have the management agency set and vary the fee to
encourage or discourage participation in the fishery.
This alternative involves two levels of legal
problems.

The first concerns the validity of using the
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taxing power for the purpose of limiting entry.

If the

Federal Government imposed such a tax, it would have to
be uniformly applied throughout the United States. 7
In addition to geographical uniformity, federal taxation
must have uniformity 9f subject matter.

The tax would

have to describe the surf clam fishery in a manner to
satisfy this requirement.8

The federal taxing power is

intended to raise revenues, but taxes with highly regulatory
motives and little revenue raising ends have been upheld.9
A limited entry tax with the revenue raising purpose of
supporting

fishery management could probably stand.
If a state should impose this kind of tax, it

might be struck down as too great an imposition on interstate commerce. 10 However, state taxes with predominately
regulatory motives have been upheld (where the commerce
question was not involved).

Recently the Supreme Court

upheld a city tax which had the effect of putting private
parking lot operators out of business. 11 The Court said
it was within the power of the city to impose "a discouraging
tax rate," and there was no constitutional bar to the city
putting "the automobile parker to the choice of using
other transportation or paying the increased tax."

Thus,

if the subject matter is within the state's police power,
it appears that the state can impose a high regulatory tax.
There are two potential legal thories for
challenging a limited entry tax.

The first alleges a
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deprivation of due process because the tax effectively
destroys property by making it economically impossible to
stay in busines:s.

The Supreme Court has consistently rejected
attacks on taxes on this theory. 12
The s:econd theory alleges discrimination on the
basis of ability to pay in violation of the equal protection
clause.

Under this theory a claimant asserts that the

effect of the tax is to exclude fishing units unable to
pay and tha.t distinguishing in allocation of government
benefits on the wealth of the recipients violates the
Constitution.

There is some authority for saying that classification based on wealth is inherently suspect 13and

requiresstrict judicial scrutiny.

This would mean the

statute would be valid only if necessary to further a
compelling state interest a.nd if it was the least drastic
means of achieving the goal.
is unlike prior wealth

The limited entry tax, however,

classification cases, for the prior

cases all dealt with express Constitutional guarantees
sue h as suffrage, and right to counsel.

Where these

fundamental rights were limited on the basis of wealth,
the Court was willing to say equal protection was violated.
The right to fish is not a right of the magnitude of these
expressed Constitutional guarantees.

So far the Court has

declined to extend the concept that discrimination by
wealth violates equal protection beyond areas where fundamental rights were infringed.

It has allowed wealth-

based discrimination in the funding of public schools,

14
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in distribution of welfare benefits, 15 and in housing. 16
The Court's record indicates that, although an equal
protection theory could be formulated, absent holding that
the right to fi.sh was a fundamental right under the
Constitution, i.t is unlikely that a limited entry tax
scheme would be struck down under the equal protection
17
clause.
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ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS FOR MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT
AND IMPLEMENTATION

Managi~ment programs may be developed and implemented
with varying opportunities for success, by individual states,
by mutual agreement among states involved in the fishery,
by mutual agreement among states and the Federal Government,
or by the Federal Government alone.

Many variations exist for

development and implementation. For example, it is possible
to develop management plans through one mechanism (state,
interstate, state-federal or federal) and implement the
management plan by an entirely different mechanism.
Under FCMA, management plans are developed through
a state-federal mechanism and implemented by federal regulation.

State jurisdiction in internal water are not sub-

ject to preemption under Section 306 (b) (1) (B) of FCMA.
Section 306 (b) (1) and (b) (2) of FCMA allows preemption
of state jurisdiction in territorial seas only under limited
.
1
circumstances.
Because jurisdiction under FCMA exist, as a general
rule

only in the FCZ, a species could be subject to a manage-

ment plan developed and implemented under FCMA and also
subject to state or interstate plans directed at management
in internal and territorial waters.

Since FCMA does not

preclude the existence or development of other regulatory
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mechanisms, the implications of various alternatives for
management dE~velopment and implementation will be examined
in the following sections.
Unilateral Governmental Development and Implementation.

Unilateral development and implementation of a

management program could occur at the state level or at the
federal level.
State Development: and Implementation
Each state may develop and implement its own
individual management program.

However, jurisdiction would

exist only in state internal waters and territorial seas
and over state citizens and vessels on the high seas.

Juris-

diction over nonresident fishing effort beyond state territorial waters would be nonexistent.

In a situation where each

state implements a different management program (or implements no program), effective

comprehensive management of the

surf clam resource would be impossible.
Federal Development and Implementation
A Constitutional basis exists for complete federal
regulation of resources such as the surf clam.

Although

exclusive federal jurisdiction would solve problems of
uniformity and enforcement associated with individual or
cooperative multi-state attempts at management or limited
federal jurisdiction under FCMA, the total preemption of
traditional state authority in this area would be politically unpalatablE~ in the states and questionable in
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terms of be:ing the best possible approach to management.
Intergovernmental Cooperation.

By definition,

intergovernmental cooperation involves at least two states
or a state and the Federal Government.

(Effective surf clam

management would, however, require considerably more than
cooperation between two states or one state and the Federal
Government).

Intergovernmental cooperation can be categorized

as interstate (i.e., cooperation between two or more states)
or state-federal (i.e., cooperation between a state or states
and the Federal Government - the plan development process
under FCMA).

Cooperation can range from casual consultation

or agreement to formal compacts requiring
of State and Federal Governments.

the approval

Federal taxing and spend-

ing powers can also serve to facilitate intergovernmental
cooperation.

The development and implementation of a manage-

ment program requires a consideration of the effectiveness and
ramifications of varying degrees of intergovernmental cooperation.
The Law of Interstate Agreements
Federal Law.

Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of

the United States Constitution states that any agreement
between states is subject to congressional consent.

In spite

of what appears to be the clear intent of the language, the
law at the present time is unclear as to when states must
obtain congressional consent.

In fact, many basic legal

issues pertaining to interstate agreements are unsettled. 2
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Judicial pronouncements on the necessity of congressional
consent have ranged from a broad interpretation covering any
agreement -··written, verbal, formal or informal 3--to a
restricted interpretation requiring consent only when the
agreement affects the balance of political power between
the states and the Federal Government.4

It has also been

argued that the modern cooperative form of agreement is
entirely outside the meaning of the compact clause of the
constitution as it was originally intended and, accordingly,
no congressional consent is necessary for agreements of this
nature. 5
The necessity of consent can raise many procedural
and substantive problems.

Congressional consent may cause

a delay of months or possibly of a year or more.
may impose conditions on the giving of consent.

Congress
It should

also be notE~d that although congressional consent is
usually given in a provision of an act or by joint resolution,
it may be inferred. 6 Congress, in an attempt to encourage
interstate coopeiration, has enacted into law provisions
granting advance consent for agreements concerning certain
subjects.
Also unclear are the legal implications of
congressional consent.

It has been held that the construction

or interpretation of a compact or agreement sanctioned by
Congress under the compact clause would be a federal question. 7
The primary issue :ts whether congressional consent raises

135

the status of the compact or agreement to the status of a
federal law.

Recent court decisions seem to endorse this

concept although most authorities hold the "Law of the
Union Doctrine," as it is called, in contempt.

Under this

doctrine it has been held that congressional consent raised
the status of the compact or agreement to that of federal
law and the compact or agreement would be binding on a
state in spite of state constitutional restriction or other
state law to the contrary.

8

It has also been held that

a compact could be interpreted contrary to the intention
of the states and the state would be bound by this interpretation.9

If a compact or agreement has the status of a federal

statute, this may affect rights of amendment, repeal, and
withdrawal.

It should also be noted that a state-federal

agreement or compact almost certainly necessitates congressional
consent or legislation.

Such a compact or agreement would, in

all probability, be considered to have the status of federal
law.
~tate Law. As a general rule state legislatures
are vested with the authority to enter into interstate
compacts or agreements on behalf of the state.

When this

power is vested solely within·the legislature, many of the
same procedural and substantive problems associated with
the necessity for Congressional consent can be found at
the state level.

Depending on constitutional and statutory
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construction, it may or may not be possible for the legislature to delegate the power to enter into interstate
agreement to governmental entities at the department or
agency level.

In many cases where delegation of authority

has been made, the extent of the power granted has been
clouded by ambiguous language, conflicting practice, or
agency reluctance to act to the full extent of the power
granted.
Interstate GoopE~ration
Two or more states can cooperate on a formal or
informal basis ranging from casual consultation to binding
compacts.

Effective management would require a binding

agreement between states to commit themselves to the
adoption and enforcement of a uniform management plan.
Existj:!l&_ Management Vehicles.

A vehicle for

interstate cooperation already exists in the form of the
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact.

Under Amend-

ment I to this interstate compact, states may delegate regulatory authority to the ASMFC. The limits of such authority,
however, are open to question and, of the five states
involved in the surf clam fishery only two, Virginia and
New Jersey have ratified Amendment I enabling the ASMFC
to act as a regulatory body.

Absent the powers granted by

Amendment I, thei ASMFC can only function in a recommendatory capacity.
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If no existing interstate agreement is suitable
as a management vehicle, then another mechanism for cooperation must be developed.

Entry into any such agree-

ment calling for interstate cooperation would, in most
instances, require dealing with problems of state legislative
consent and almost certainly Congressional consent. (Unfortunately conclusive statements regarding requirement of
Congressional consent and its implications are impossible
to make at the present time due to the unsettled nature of
the law on those points.
State-Federal Cooperation
Another alternative means of development and
implementation, in addition to unilateral or interstate
action, is state-federal cooperation.
formal or informal nature.
already exist.

This can be of a

Many avenues for such an approach

The State-Federal Program, ASMFC, and most

recently FCMA are major examples of existing institution
providing means for state-federal cooperation.
Perhaps the most significant alternative for
state-federal cooperation is direct federal participation
in agreements of an interstate nature.

However, other

means of state-federal cooperation exist in addition to
direct federal participation in interstate compacts or
agreements and some are more feasible than others in the
context of fisheries management.

For example, state-federal
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cooperation can be fostered through federal exercise of
the spending power specifically enumerated in the constitution.
Under authority of the spending power, grants to states could
be conditioned on state compliance with certain policy goals.
Although not as attractive as federal grants, another alternative would be the use of the federal taxing power to induce
state cooperation and to achieve policy goals.

Given the

appropriate legislative structure, management goals could
be fostered by delegations of federal power to the state,
state adoption of federal regulatory criteria or federal
implementation of state or state-federal plans.
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CONCLUSIONS
Management DevE:!lopment and Implementation
FCMA provides for state-federal cooperation in
the development of management plans and federal implementation
of the plan.

Plans developed under FCMA are generally

limited to the FCZ.

State authority in internal waters

is not subject to federal preemption under FCMA. Preemption of state jurisdiction in territorial seas is
possible under limited circumstances.

Within internal

waters and territorial seas state, interstate, or statefederal alternatives for management development and
implementation remain possible.

If however, lack of an

effective management mechanism in state waters thwarts
overall resource management, federal preemption is possible.
Alternative Management Schemes
Only the user tax, of all the proposed schemes,
would be impermissable under FCMA.

In the context

of state regulation in internal waters and territorial
seas, each scheime must be independently evaluated according
to the current status of the law in question in each state.

